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ARTICLE 9
"Not only were conservative tendencies present during the
drafting; they were visible on the horizon at the legislative stage.
The draftsmen and the members of the sponsor organizations knew
that to draft a dead-letter bill would accomplish nothing. The Code
had to be enacted ......

Homer Kripke

I

Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") is, by all accounts,
the crowning achievement of the UCC project,2 and perhaps of the entire
uniform law enterprise. 3 Not just a codification of pre-Code law,' Article 9
transformed the law of secured transactions. 5 According to Grant Gilmore,
"[p]re-Code personal property security law may be described as closely
resembling that obscure wood in which Dante discovered the gates of hell."6
Gilmore and Alison Dunham, the principal drafters of Article 9, hoped that
"with a little pruning and clearing, [they] could turn the obscure wood into
a peoples['] park where widows and orphans and country bankers could
enjoy their innocent pleasures, safe from the attack of ravening wild beasts
and trustees in bankruptcy."7 Gilmore and Dunham had three goals: to
simplify and regularize the law, to make it uniform,8 and to make secured
1.

Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, U.

I1l. L. F. 321, 327 (1962).
2. The UCC project is jointly administered by the American Law Institute ("ALI") and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL').
3. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security
Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 Va. L. Rev. 2021, 2021 (1994) ("In embarking

upon the revision of what many consider the most successful commercial statute ever .... );
Edward L. Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revisions of Articles 3 and 4, 42 Ala. L Rev.
551, 557 (1991) [hereinafter Rubin, Efficiency, Equity] ("For commercial law professors [born in
the 1940s], the greatest conceptual achievement in the field was Article 9 of the U.C.C. Its
drafters, Gilmore and Dunham, had unified the various forms of security instruments-chattel
mortgages, trust receipts, field warehouses, pledges and so forth-into a single coherent
framework with a new, generic terminology.").
4. The ALI and NCCUSL promulgated the original Uniform Commercial Code in 1951
and released it in 1952. Pennsylvania promptly adopted it. The statute hit rougher going,
however, in the key state of New York, where a study by the New York Law Revision
Commission "led to substantial revisions that were embodied in the 1957 and 1958 Official
Texts." John 0. Honnold et al., Security Interests in Personal Property 4 (2d ed. 1992).
5. This is in stark contrast to Articles 3 and 4, which went to great lengths to recreate
and codify the earlier Negotiable Instruments Law and Bank Collections Code. Rubin,
Efficiency, Equity, supra note 3, at 553-54.
6. Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code:
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 605, 620 (1981) [hereinafter Gilmore, Good

Faith Purchase]. The official comment to section 9-101, infra note 97, reflects the drafters'
perception of pre-Code law.
7.

Gilmore, Good Faith Purchase,supra note 6, at 620.

8. The goals of simplicity and uniformity are stated in the U.C.C. itself. Section 1-102(2)
states that the Code's "purpose" is "(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
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credit "safe" for widows and orphans. Within the constraints of existing
technology, they accomplished the first two goals and, by inventing the
Article 9 filing system, made great strides towards achieving the third.
Because Article 9 has been such a success, efforts to revise that Article
offer an excellent lens for viewing both the strengths and weaknesses of the
uniform law drafting process. The current effort to revise Article 9 has
pursued the goals of simplicity and uniformity, and the revisers ("Revisers")
have prepared a draft that responds successfully to technological change.9
Concerns remain, however, about safety. While the Article 9 drafters
addressed the dangers of secured credit that related to disclosure, by 1981,
when Gilmore wrote the passage quoted above, the scope of his concerns
had broadened.'" He recognized, as have others, that Article 9 may raise
concerns that go beyond giving widows and orphans notice of an existing
security interest. Secured credit may create an incentive for debtors to make
unreasonably small investments in product and workplace safety while
imposing the costs of this risky strategy on involuntary creditors and other
creditors who do not have a meaningful ability to protect against or adjust
to this risk." The Article 9 revision process has not explored or responded
to this concern inany meaningful way.
In addition to concern about the third-party effects of secured credit,
concerns have been raised since Gilmore's death about the need to protect
consumers from some of the harsh effects of Article 9's remedy provisions.
While these concerns were fully aired at meetings of the drafting committee,
here too, the Proposed Final Draft does nothing to make secured credit
safer for consumers.
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; [and] (c) to make uniform the law
among the various jurisdictions." U.C.C. § 1-102 (1995). Simplicity was achieved by making it
easier to create, id. § 9-203, and perfect, id. § 9-302, security interests. Uniformity was
achieved by replacing the wide variety of pre-Code security devices with a single security
device called a "security interest," id. § 1-201(37), and more importantly by the fact that the
statute was adopted by all fifty states.
9. See infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text. Writing about a law reform in progress
is always a tricky exercise. One is writing about a moving target. When the first draft of this
article was completed, the August 1997 Draft was the current version. When it was accepted
for publication, the February 1997 Draft was the current version. As the article goes to press,
in April of 1998, the Drafting Committee is completing its work, and has promulgated a
Proposed Final Draft of Revised Article 9. In particular, developments relating to consumer
protection provisions in the Revision have required me to take later events into account. In
April of 1997, the representatives of the consumer credit industry and consumer advocates
were at loggerheads. This provided a straightforward example of the difficulties that the
uniform law process has in dealing with distributive questions. Since that time, events have
taken an interesting turn. In a series of extraordinary eleventh hour negotiations guided by
Marion Benfield, Neil Cohen, and others acting as mediators, the two adversaries concluded a
peace treaty under which the consumer credit industry agreed to support, and consumer
advocates agreed not to oppose, the ProposedFinal Draft. This is a remarkable achievement. I
have made a number of revisions to reflect these events but in all fairness they require a more
thorough treatment than this particular Article could accommodate.
10. See infra text accompanying note 110.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 142-50.

ARTICLE 9
In this Article, I develop a theoretical model, based on the Revisers'
desire for universal adoption of revised Article 9 (the "Revision"), 2 that (1)
explains both the inability of the Revisers to address concerns about safety
(others might use the terms "efficiency"' 3 or "distributive justice" 4 ) 5 and
their success with regard to the goal of simplicity, and (2) can be used to
predict when the uniform law process will fail in other contexts.
A. The Article 9 Revision: Consensus on Simplicity and Division on Safety

The Article 9 revision process has generated two broad types of reform
proposals. The first type aims to further Gilmore's goal of simplicity. 6
These proposals seek to bring Article 9 out of the 1950s and into the 1990s
by recognizing and accommodating advances in technology and financial
practice.' 7 The second type of proposal aims to further the goal of safety,
12. The Revisers' desire for universal and uniform adoption is placed in high relief in the
Reporters' Prefatory Comments to the Proposed Final Draft of Revised Article 9. Late in the
drafting process, disagreements between consumer advocates and representatives of the
consumer credit industry threatened to derail the process. An eleventh hour agreement was
struck at the February and March 1998 Drafting Committee meetings. The resulting statutory
provisions were described by the Reporters as follows:
[mlhe proposed solution of the consumer-related issues has been recognized by all
concerned as a compromise. The statutory text that has emerged is less than ideal
in substance and approach. It represents a balance struck in the hope that it will
enhance the opportunities for prompt and uniform enactment of revised Article 9.
Reporters' Prefatory Comments, Revision of Uniform Commercial Code Article 9-Secured
Transactions (Proposed Final Draft April 6, 1998) [hereinafter Proposed Final Draft], at
xxxiii. See infra text accompanying notes 169-72.
13. Alan Schwartz, Bob Scott, Saul Levmore, and others fall into this category.
14. Lynn LoPucki, Elizabeth Warren and Bill Woodward would fall into this group. I
prefer to use the term "safety," because it incorporates both concerns. Secured credit may be
"inefficient" if it causes debtors to underinvest in workplace safety, or if it creates an incentive
for the shareholders of an undercapitalized company to embark on an unreasonably risky
business strategy. But Gilmore's concerns, articulated in 1981, seem to encompass more than
mere efficiency. In his view, some people (i.e., widows and orphans, or, perhaps, consumers)
may simply need to be protected from the harsh effects of secured credit. Gilmore, Good Faith
Purchase,supra note 6, at 627.

15. James White argues that the lack of consensus regarding the rules contained in the
Article 9 (and Article 2) revisions creates a significant risk that the proposed revisions will not
achieve uniform adoption. James J. White, Comments at 1997 AALS Annual Meeting: Consumer
Protection and the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 219, 222 (1997) [hereinafter
White, Comments].

16. For example, Professor LoPucki has argued that the debtor's location or state of
incorporation should be the state of filing for all types of collateral. Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Article 9 FilingSystem: Why the Debtor's State of IncorporationShould Be the ProperPlacefor Article 9

Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 Minn. L Rev. 577, 580 (1995) [hereinafter LoPucki, Filing].This
change reflects the fact that it is now possible for attorneys to search the UCC records in
distant states through the use of on-line services. Id.; see also David M. Phillips, Secured Credit
and Bankruptcy: A Callfor the Federalizationof PersonalPropertySecurity Lau', 50 Law & Contemp.

Probs. 53, 73 (1987) (noting that technological advances make a national filing system
feasible).
17. The Article 9 drafters could not have envisioned the advances in technology that have
occurred since 1951. Article 9 was drafted prior to the advent of electronic copiers and
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broadly construed.'" These safety oriented proposals fall into two further
subcategories. One group of proposals turns on the recognition that the
success of Article 9 has created a new set of dangers to creditors who are not
parties to the secured financing transaction-the rule of full priority for
secured claims makes it possible, in certain situations, for the shareholders
of highly leveraged businesses to shift the costs of risky business strategies
and dangerous activities from themselves to employees, tort claimants, and
other creditors who cannot adjust the interest rate they charge to account
for the increased riskiness of their investments.'9 The costs of these gambles
by highly leveraged debtors will be borne largely by Gilmore's "widows and
orphans.,2 1 The second group of proposals turns on the recognition that
Article 9 has made it easier for creditors to take security interests as part of
consumer credit transactions, and that provisions that make sense in the
commercial context may lead to unduly harsh results and unfair surprise
where unsophisticated parties are involved.2'
The drafting committee for the Article 9 Revision (the "Drafting
Committee"), chaired by William Burke, and the co-reporters, Professors
Charles Mooney and Steven Harris, have shown a markedly different
willingness and capacity to respond to these two broad types of proposals.
computers, and well prior to the invention of the Internet. Carbon paper was the principal
method of duplication. The drafters hoped that the Article 9 filing system would provide a
cheap and effective means of providing notice of a security interest at a time when the costs of
transactional filing were prohibitive. Douglas G. Baird, Security Interests Reconsidered, 80 Va. L.
Rev. 2249, 2249-50 (1994); see also Peter A.Alces, Abolish the Article 9 FilingSystem, 79 Minn. L.
Rev. 679 (1995) (proposing a system under which state officials would give authoritative
opinions on priority).
18. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Article 9 Set Aside for Unsecured Creditors, UCC Bulletin,
Oct. 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Warren, Proposal. The Warren Proposal is modeled on a proposal
made by Professors Bebchuck and Fried. Lucian Arye Bebchuck &Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy
Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 Yale LJ. 857, 904 (1996). Professor
LoPucki has advocated a priority for tort claimants for similar reasons. Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1887, 1908-09 (1994) [hereinafter LoPucki,
Bargain].
19. Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 18, at 882-83; LoPucki, Bargain,supra note 18, at 1898;
see infra Part II.A.3. An unreasonably risky business strategy increases the risk of business
failure faced by employees. An inadequate investment in workplace or product safety increases
the risk faced by tort claimants that the claim will go unpaid.
20. The burden is likely to be borne principally by tort claimants, lifetime employees of
the debtor and unsophisticated investors. Employee and tort claims are of greater concern
than those of trade creditors. Trade creditors can factor the risk that an individual customer
will fail into the price that they charge all customers. By contrast, an employee is not in a
position to spread the risk of employer failure. Neither is the employee likely to ask for a raise
the day after the corporation becomes the subject of a leveraged buyout. When tort claimants
are involved, the claim is not the product of a consensual transaction, so there is no
mechanism for obtaining a risk premium. See also infra text accompanying notes 143-50.
21. There have been a number of proposals aimed at protecting consumers from the
harsh effects of consensual secured transactions. Gail Hillebrand of the Consumers Union has
spearheaded this effort, and while she initially had some success in softening the effect of
Article 9's remedial scheme on consumers, the current version of the Revision contains fewer
consumer protection provisions than earlier drafts. See infra Part II.B.
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Proposals aimed at the goal of simplicity have met with favor-discussions
of technological and technical issues have been spirited, and the Revisers
have incorporated a number of important suggestions for reform.22 By
contrast, the response of the Revisers to concerns about the third-party
effects of secured credit and consumer protection-the safety of secured
credit-has proven more divisive. To deal with the third-party effects of
secured credit, Professor Elizabeth Warren proposed an amendment to
section 9-301 (the "Warren Proposal") that, if included in the Revision
would have required a debtor's bankruptcy trustee to set aside twenty
percent of the proceeds of the sale of collateral to pay the claims of
unsecured creditors.23 Professor Mooney has been openly hostile to the
substance of the Warren proposal, arguing, only half seriously, that a better
solution lies outside the UCC, in "abolishing the limited liability of
corporate shareholders."2' The Revisers initially relegated the question of
absolute priority and consideration of the externality of secured credit to a
statement of policy issues, 25 and ultimately Warren's proposal was
summarily rejected by the Drafting Committee with virtually no discussion.
The question then vanished from the agenda. 26 The Revision does not
22. For example, in response to LoPucki's suggestion that a corporation's state of
incorporation should determine the appropriate location for filing, Professors Harris and
Mooney stated: "We are pleased to see this article, not only because we are inclined to agree
with its conclusion, but also because its appearance supports one of the strengths of the UCO
revision process." Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Choosing the Law Governing
Perfection: The Data and Politics of Article 9 Filing, 79 Minn. L Rev. 663, 663 (1995). Indeed,
section 9-301 of the Proposed Final Draft amends current section 9-103 to provide that the
law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located will govern filing. Proposed Final Draft,
supra note 12.
23. Warren, Proposal,supra note 18, at 1.
24. Audio tape of meeting of the Commercial Law Section of the American Association of
Law Schools (Jan. 1996) (on file with author and available from the AA.S); see also Susan
Block-Lieb, The Unsecured Creditor'sBargain: A Reply, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1989, 1995 (1994) ("The
question therefore becomes whether the secured creditors of a corporate debtor are better
cost avoiders than its shareholders."); id. at 1996-97 (arguing that analysis of the "second-best
cost avoider" is also necessary); id. at n.26 (presenting others' views regarding parties (e.g.,
contract creditors, corporate sponsors) best able to absorb the expense of tort recovery or
pension claims); cf. LoPucki, Bargain, supra note 18, at 1915 (responding that reforms
producing either unlimited liability or involuntary creditor priority alone are incomplete
solutions to the same problem).
25. U.C.C. Revised Article 9: Secured Transactions; Sales of Accounts and Chattel Paper,
and Payment Intangibles (Proposed DraftJuly 19, 1996) [hereinafter July Draft], statement of
policy issues.
26. William J. Woodward, The Realist and Secured Credit: Grant Gilmore, Common Law
Courts, and the Article 9 Reform Process, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1511, 1512 (1997) ("However, despite
the central nature of priority in the institution of secured credit, the Warren Proposal received
a hostile reception within the Article 9 reform process. There was, perhaps predictably, a
flurry of letters and short articles decrying either the details of the Proposal or what it would
do to deserving borrowers. Subsequently, the Article 9 Drafting Committee unanimously
rejected it, apparently, without any voice in its support."). Among the articles criticizing the
Warren Proposal are Lisa M. Bossetti & Mette H. Kurth, Professor Elizabeth Warren's Article 9
Carve-Out Proposal:A Strategic Analysis, 30 UCC LJ. 3 (1997), Hugh Ray, Bankruptcy Law, Tex.
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presently include any substantive provisions aimed at addressing this
problem.27 The response to proposals aimed at creditor overreaching was
more complicated. A number of these proposals were incorporated into
early drafts of the Revision. These, however, proved highly controversial
and led to a walk out by members of the consumer credit industry. Only an
eleventh hour compromise saved the process. Under that compromise
virtually all of the controversial provisions were removed from the Proposed
Final Draft in return for deletion of provisions that would have been
harmful to consumers. 8
Professor Mooney's response to the substance of Professor Warren's
proposal 2 is illustrative on two levels. First, it reflects his recognition that
the safety of secured credit is a concern that goes to the very core of the law
of corporate finance; debtors may use either secured credit, limited liability,
or both to render themselves judgment-proof"0 Second, and more
important, Mooney's response, and the fate of the proposed consumer
protection provisions reflects a belief (probably correct) that any effort to
resolve these problems through the Article 9 revision process will likely
doom the Revision project.3 In short, Article 9 may have reached a point
where the Revisers cannot pursue the goals of safety and uniformity
simultaneously. To achieve the goal of uniformity the Revisers may have to
sacrifice the goal of safety.
B. Hobson's Choice: Uniformity or Safety
Since the inception of the uniform law project, its sponsor
organizations, the American Law Institute ("ALI") and National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"), have measured the
success of each uniform drafting effort by counting the number of uniform
adoptions. 2 Under this criterion, the UCC has been a great success.
Law., June 10, 1996, at 26-28, and Jeffrey S. Turner, The Broad Scope of Revised Article 9 Is
Justified, 50 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 328 (1996).
27. July Draft, supra note 25, at 9.
28. See infra notes 171-72.
29. Mooney's comment was made in January of 1996, which predates the publication of
the Warren Proposal by several months. However, proposals for a 20% carveout and for
priority of tort claims had been made previously, see supra note 18, and Mooney was
responding to those proposals.
30. See Lynn LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale UJ. 1, 14 (1996) [hereinafter
LoPucki, Death] ("[Slecured debt strategies are the most complex and the most common of the
judgment proofing strategies.").
31. Harris and Mooney have stated their views on the efficiency and desirability of
secured credit:
[W]e take as our "first principle" that... Article 9 should facilitate the creation of
security interests .... [W]e think the transfer of an effective security interest ought
to be as easy, inexpensive, and reliable as possible .... The law should not impair
the ability of debtors to secure as much or as little of their debts with as much or as
little of their existing and future property as they deem appropriate.
Harris & Mooney, supra note 3, at 2021-22.
32. Indeed the NCCUSL web page contains a special section devoted to tallying the
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Although it is showing its age,33 all fifty states have adopted it,-" and it
remains a significant improvement upon the laws that it replaced. That the
UCC has won out in the competition among legislative alternatives is
generally viewed as evidence of its substantive superiority.! Commercial law
scholars have given little thought, however, to whether this desire for
uniformity among state laws might have a darker side.
In this Article, I argue that, in the competition among statutory rules
and the competition among states, there are a number of predictable and
identifiable reasons why the best statute may not win out. When these
concerns are implicated, the desire of uniform law drafters for uniform
adoption will cause the ALI and NCCUSL to promulgate inappropriate"6
number of states that have adopted various uniform laws. The address for this page is
http:/Avww.nccusl.org/targetacts.html.
33. The University of Minnesota Law Review held an excellent symposium that collects
much of the current thought on the state of the current Article 9 filing system. See Edward S.
Adams, Forward to Symposium, "Managingthe PaperTrail'" Evaluatingand Reforming the Article
9 FilingSystem, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 519 (1995); Edward S. Adams et al., A Revised FilingSystem:
Recommendations and Innovations, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 877 (1995); Alces, supra note 17; John D.
Ayer, Some Comments on Bowers, 79 Minn. L Rev. 745 (1995); Carl S. Bjerre, Bankruptcy Taxes
and Other FilingFacts:A Commentary on ProfessorBowers, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 757 (1995); James W.
Bowers, Of Bureaucrats' Brothers-in-Law and Bankruptcy Taxes: Article 9 Filing Systems and the
Marketfor Information, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 721 (1995); David Gray Carlson, Debt Collection as Rent
Seeking, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 817 (1995); Hon. Nancy C. Dreher, One Judge's rwe,of the Uniform
Commercial Code in Bankruptcy Court: Why It Doesn't Work The Way You Thought It Would, 79

Minn. L. Rev. 777 (1995); R. Wilson Freyermuth, Comments on a Revised FilingSystem, 79 Minn.
L. Rev. 957 (1995); Harris & Mooney, supra note 22; LoPucki, Filing, supra note 16; Fred H.
Miller, The Future of Uniform State Legislation in the Private Law Area, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 861
(1995); Vance K. Opperman, Opening Comments on Electronic Commercial Filings and the National
Information Infrastructure, 79 Minn. L Rev. 771 (1995); Linda J. Rusch, The Article 9 Filing
System: Why A Race-Recording Model Is Unworkable, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 565 (1995); Robert E.
Scott, Commentary on Professor Carlson'sArticle: The Mythology of Article 9, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 853
(1995); Paul M. Shupack, Preferred CapitalStructuresand the Question of Filing, 79 Minn. L. Rev.
787 (1995); Edwin E. Smith, Commentary on Abolish the Article 9: Filing System by Professor Peter
Alces, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 715 (1995); James J. White, Reforming Article 9 Prioritiesin Light of Old
Ignoranceand Neu, FilingRules, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 529 (1995).

34.

Louisiana was for a long time the last hold-ouL It adopted parts of the UCG in four

steps between 1974 and 1988, Richard B. Amandes, The Uniform Land TransactionsAct and the
Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act Twenty Years Later: Why Have There Been No

Adoptions?, 20 Nova L. Rev. 1033, 1034 (1996), and has now adopted all but Article 2. William
D. Hawkland, The Unform Commercial Code and the Civil Codes, 56 La. L. Rev. 231, 242-43

(1995).
35. Douglas J. Whaley, Secured Transactions 1-14 (1994) (describing pre-Code security
devices). U.C.C. § 9-204, cmt. 2 (1995) ("In pre-Code law there was a multiplication of security
devices....").
36. When I use the term "appropriate" or "optimal" to describe a legal rule, I am
intentionally avoiding both the economist's term "efficient," and the philosopher's term "just."
"Appropriateness" as I use the term contains both an efficiency component and a legitimacy
component. First, other things being equal, a legal rule should be "efficient," or to be more
exact, "Pareto optimal." It should not be a rule that creates unnecessary transaction costs or
deadweight loss. Second, appropriateness has a legitimacy component. While I do not pretend
to be presenting a unified conception of a 'just" rule, at the very least, a legal rule should be
generated by a procedurally fair legal process. That is to say that the political process that
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legal rules. I identify these factors and demonstrate that their presence
explains, at least in part,

7

the unwillingness of the Revisers to incorporate

provisions into the Revision that regulate the externality of secured credit
or that seek to protect consumers. At the same time, the absence of these
factors explains why the drafting effort has been successful at dealing with
proposals that respond to technological change.
C. The Dark Side of Uniformity: Enactability, Captureand the Race to the Bottom
At first glance, concern about the dynamics of federalism would not
appear relevant to efforts to promulgate uniform laws. The purpose of the
ALI/NCCUSL project is, after all, to neutralize the effects of the federal
system on commercial and other transactions by making state laws uniform.
However, as states revise their commercial codes and decide whether to
adopt revisions to the UCC, individual interest groups may capture the
legislative process in a particular state. Moreover, even if an interest group
has not captured the legislature, state legislators have an incentive to draft
or adopt statutes that will enhance that state's attractiveness to businesses;
states may use commercial law as a means to compete with each other.
When either capture of individual state legislature or state competition is
likely to lead to nonuniform adoption, the drive for uniform and universal
adoption will force the drafters of uniform laws to anticipate the results of
capture and of state competition and adopt legal rules that neutralize these
forces in an effort to smooth the path of the statute through state
legislatures.
A number of commercial law scholars have recognized the possibility
that the uniform law process itself might be captured. 8 Indeed, suggestions
of capture in the Article 4 context have caused the discussion to take on an
generates the rule should not be one that is systematically stacked in favor of one interest

group, regardless of the merits of its position.
37. There is no doubt that nany participants in the revision process sincerely believe that
the Warren Proposal is a bad idea. For a description of the Drafting Committee meeting that
resulted in rejection of the Warren Proposal, see Alvin C. Harrell, Article 9 Drafting Committee
Considers Consumer Issues Subcommittee Report, 50 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 189, 193-94 (1996)
(reporting statements that Professor Warren's observations regarding secured creditor
behavior did not comport with the experiences of those present). See also Woodward, supra
note 26, at 1512. Moreover, empirical work remains to be done. See infra text accompanying
notes 148-50. However, at least some participants in the revision process appear to be driven
by concern about uniformity. Professor Mooney's "not in my Code" response seems to fit into
this category.
38. Professors Rubin and Patchel have detailed the influence of the banking industry on
the revisions of Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC. Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics,
Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78

Minn. L. Rev. 83, 103-105 (1993); Rubin, Efficiency, Equity, supra note 3, at 552-60; Edward L
Rubin, Thinking Like a Lauyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising UCC

Articles 3 and 4, 26 Loy. LA. L. Rev. 743, 744-59 (1993) [hereinafter Rubin, Thinking Like a

Lauyer]. Professor Scott has suggested that the Article 9 Study Group may have been captured
by banking interests. Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 Va. L Rev. 1783, 1822-47
(1994),
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ad honinen tone.39 These scholars have not recognized, however, that actual
capture may not be the problem. Even when an interest group has not
captured the uniform law drafting process, the drafters may be forced, in
the interest of enactability, to anticipate and approximate the rule that
would be produced by a captured state legislature. ° Thus, when seeking to
predict the success or failure of the uniform law process, it is crucial not
only to predict capture, but to predict when the anticipated capture of state
legislatures is likely to drive the uniform law drafting process.
In addition to anticipating capture, the drafters of uniform laws must
anticipate the effects of state competition. In this regard, corporate law
scholars have long recognized that the dynamic forces of federalism can
operate as a double-edged sword. Competition among states (for corporate
charters, for example) may cause states to adopt efficient rules to attract
incorporations, causing what Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel
Fischel, 4' among others, have described as a "race to the top." But states
may also seek to attract corporations by adopting rules that allow corporate
42
managers-who control the incorporation decision-to transfer value
from shareholders and other corporate constituencies. When this is the
case, competition among states will result in what Professor William Cary
first described as a "race to the bottom."43
39. Professor Rubin's suggestion that the Article 3 and 4 revision process was captured
has dearly engendered some animosity. At the 1997 Annual Meeting of the Commercial Law
Section of the American Association of Law Schools, Donald Rapson criticized Rubin for
failing to attend the meetings of the Article 3 and 4 drafting committees. Concerns about
capture are not new. In 1962, Homer Kripke felt the need to respond to the allegation that
the UCCwas a sell-out to banking interests. Kripke, supra note 1, at 327-28.
40. Id. at 327 ("[N]ot only were conservative tendencies present during the drafting, they
were visible on the horizon at the legislative stage.") As Kripke appears to have recognized,
this insight is important for political as well as descriptive reasons. If the desire for uniformity,
rather than actual capture, is the culprit, the language of anticipated capture may allow the
drafters to discuss the problem of interest group influence without resorting to name calling.
41. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and
Evidence, 9 Del. J. Corp. L. 540, 571 (1984) (describing the race-to-the-top); Daniel R. Fischel,
The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation
Law, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 913, 919 (1982) (attacking the thesis that state competition causes lax
corporate standards, and arguing that interstate competition creates efficient markets); see also
Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition"
Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259, 282 (1980) (arguing that federal regulation is
unnecessary); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Lau, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 256-57 (1977) (questioning the conventional wisdom that
federal regulation is needed to control corporate managers and to protect shareholders).
42. This transfer of value may occur in the form of high salaries, stock options or
business opportunities.
43. William L. Cary, Federalismand Corporate La': Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale LJ.
663, 665-66 (1974). Although Cary first coined the phrase "race to the bottom," the same
phenomenon was described earlier by Justice Brandeis as a "race to laxity:"
The removal by the leading industrial States of the limitations upon the size and
powers of business corporations appears to have been due, not to their conviction
that maintenance of the restrictions was undesirable in itself, but to the conviction
that it was futile to insist upon them; because local restriction would be
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When the drive for uniformity causes the drafters of a uniform law to
mimic the results of a race to the top the effect is beneficial. When state
competition will lead to a race to the bottom, the desire for uniform
adoption will compel the drafters to find thefloor. The universal adoption of
a uniform statute may thereby facilitate and accelerate the adoption of an
inappropriate rule. Thus, so long as the state legislatures can be expected to
act in the public interest, the scrutiny of fifty state legislatures will be a
beneficial aspect of the uniform law process. However, if state legislatures
are likely to be captured by special interests, anticipation of capture by the
uniform law drafters will make such scrutiny counterproductive. Similarly, if
state competition is likely to yield a race to the top, then the desire for
uniformity will be beneficial, but if such competition is likely to yield a race
to the bottom, the effect will be to cause the promulgation and uniform
adoption of an inefficient or otherwise inappropriate rule.
D. The Decision Rule-Predictingthe Effects ofAnticipated Capture and
Anticipated State Competition
In Part I, I argue that it is possible to predict when anticipated
capture" or an anticipated race to the bottom45 will drive the uniform law
drafting process. I therefore seek to develop a decision rule that the
Revisers can use to determine which legal questions the uniform law process
should seek to tackle, and which legal questions should be left to
nonuniform and/or federal law. First, I argue that uniform state law should
not be used to promulgate rules where interest group theory would predict
capture of the uniform law process or of state legislatures. This concern
circumvented by foreign incorporation. Indeed, local restriction seemed worse than
futile. Lesser States, eager for the revenue derived from the traffic in charters, had
removed safeguards from their own incorporation laws. Companies were early
formed to provide charters for corporations in states where the cost was lowest and
the laws least restrictive. The states joined in advertising their wares. The race was
one not of diligence but of laxity. Incorporation under such laws was possible; and the
great industrial States yielded in order not to lose wholly the prospect of the
revenue and the control incident to domestic incorporation.
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 US. 517, 557-60 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See also Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in
CompetitionAmongJurisdictionsin Environmental Law, 14 YaleJ. on Reg. 67 (1996).

44. Here, I stand on the shoulders of Patchel, supra note 38, at 83; Rubin, Efficiency,
Equity, supra note 3, at 551; Rubin, Thinking Like a Lauyer, supra note 38, at 753; and Scott,
supra note 38, at 1783.

45.

Here, I stand on the shoulders of corporate law scholars and their debate about the

so called "race to the bottom." See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuck, Federalism and the
Corporation; The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435

(1992) [hereinafter Bebchuck, Federalism]; Cary, supra note 43, at 663; David Charny,
CompetitionAmongJurisdictionsin FormulatingCorporateLau' Rules: An American Perspective on the
"Race to the Bottom" in European Communities, 32 Harv. Int'l I.J. 423 (1991);Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L Rev.
469 (1987); Roberta Romano, Lau' as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.

Econ. & Org. 225 (1985); Donald E. Schwartz, Federalismand CorporateGovernance, 45 Ohio St.

UJ. 545 (1984).

ARTICLE 9
arises where the rule is distributive and there is an asymmetric allocation of
power among interested groups. Second, I argue that uniform state law
should not be used to promulgate rules where interest group theory would
predict either a race to the bottom, or an anticipation of a race to the
bottom by the uniform law process. These concerns arise where a rule
creates the possibility of either intrafirm or interstate externality. When a
uniform law implicates any of these concerns, there is reason to believe that
federal or nonuniform state legislation will produce more efficient and
more equitable rules.4"
In Parts II and III, I ask whether capture, anticipated capture, or
anticipated state competition are having a discernible effect on the content
of Revised Article 9. In Part III, I examine current efforts to revise Article 9
and contrast the Drafting Committee's response to proposals that aim to
reform the priority scheme or protect consumers with the Drafting
Committee's response to proposals that aim to simplify and modernize the
statutory scheme. In Part IV, I ask whether capture, anticipated capture or
anticipated race to the bottom explain the Article 9 Revisers' unwillingness
to incorporate proposals addressed to the negative externalities of secured
credit and their simultaneous willingness to include proposals addressed to
simplicity. I conclude that, although the drafting process probably is not
captured, anticipated capture has played a role in the debate over consumer
protection provisions, and both anticipated capture and anticipated state
competition (in its pernicious form) have played a significant role in the
debate over the Warren Proposal. By contrast, anticipated state competition
(in its beneficial form) appears to have driven the Revisers' efforts to
respond to technological change.
In Part IV, I ask whether nonuniform state law or federal law provide a
better legislative forum to generate legal rules when the uniform law
process is likely to fail. I conclude that collective-action problems and state
competition will seriously impair state law efforts to legislate, but that a
federal solution, while not perfect, is possible. While collective-action
problems may still exist at the federal level, they are less powerful than at
the state level. More importantly, use of federal legislation eliminates the
perverse effects of state competition entirely. As a result, palliative
responses, such as enhancement of representation of underrepresented
46. There is a third category of statutes when use of uniform laws may not be
appropriate. In some instances the existence of a race to the top will counsel against use of the
uniform law process. There actual state competition may be preferable to anticipated state
competition. See F. Stephen Knippenberg & WilliamJ. Woodward, Jr., Uniformity and Efficiency
in the Uniform Commercial Code: A PartialResearch Agenda, 45 Bus. Law. 2519, 2524

(1990)

(discussing the reasons for and effects of nonuniform provisions in the U.G.C.); Larry E.
Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. Legal Stud.

131, 140 (1996) ("A decentralized decision-making process normally can produce more

possible solutions to a problem than could a single rulemaker."). In these instances, the
benefits of competition must be weighed against the benefits of uniformity. Where commercial

law is involved, however, the need for uniformity is paramount, and the relevant choice is
between uniform state law and federal law.
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groups, may be more successful.
This Article concludes, therefore, that the Revisers should continue to
focus their efforts on reducing the transaction costs associated with secured
credit, but that the fundamental policy choices implicated by the rule of full
priority and consumer protection should be addressed through federal or

nonuniform state law.
I.

PREDICTING WHEN THE UNIFORM LAW PROCESS WILL FAIL

Recent efforts to revise the Uniform Commercial Code have prompted
a number of efforts to study and explain the uniform law process. Some
commentators have focused on interest group forces while others have
focused their attention on federalism. On the interest group side of the
equation, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott, 47 Edward Rubin, 4s and Kathleen
Patchel"9 have pointed out that interest groups may, at times, capture the
ALI/NCCUSL process. On the federalism side, Larry Ribstein and Bruce
Kobayashi have concluded that the imprimatur of the uniform law project
impairs the ability of states to distinguish efficient from inefficient uniform
enactments. 50 Standing alone, these two approaches are incomplete. In this
Part, I seek to unify these two strands of scholarship-the interest group
approach and the federalism approach-by articulating a simple decision
rule to allow uniform law drafters and federal and state legislators to predict
when the uniform law process is most likely to generate efficient or
equitable rules and when it is most likely to generate inefficient or
inequitable rules. In the remainder of the Article, I seek to show that this
decision rule is descriptive, predictive and prescriptive; it describes what has
already happened in connection with the Revision of Article 9 and other
articles of the UCC; and it can be used to define and circumscribe the
appropriate domain for uniform laws.
47. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy of Private Legislatures, 143
U. Pa. L. Rev. 595, 638-43 (1995) (discussing the influence that banks had on the creation and
revisions of Articles 3 and 4); Scott, supra note 38, at 1822-47 (examining the influence of

interest groups on the Article 9 revision process).
48. See Rubin, Efficiency, Equity, supra note 3, at 589 ("The bankers and bank attorneys
who have dominated the U.C.C. drafting process are probably aware of the concerns that
consumer representatives would tend to raise. But they evaluate these concerns from their own
particular perspective."); Rubin, Thinking Like a Lauyer, supra note 38, at 787 ("In the process
of drafting and enacting the revisions of Articles 3 and 4... one of the major forces was not
present. Banks were well represented; corporate users were represented intermittently; but
consumers were virtually unrepresented. The result was that the banking industry and its
attorneys dominated the entire process, save for a few brief interludes.").
49. Patchel, supra note 38, at 126 ("Why does the uniform law process tend to produce
commercial laws that fail to protect consumer interests effectively?... [The answer seems to
lie in the absence of adequate consumer representation in the uniform laws process.").
50. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 46, at 132 ("First, we show that the states most
widely adopt the NCCUSL's proposals in situations in which uniformity is most efficient ....
However, we also find evidence that indicates the NCCUSL has proposed many laws in which
uniformity is not efficient and that the NCCUSL can increase the probability that these
proposals are adopted by some states.").

ARTICLE 9
A. The Benefits of the Uniform Law Process
The first step in determining when the uniform law process will fail is
to ask why it is ever better than nonuniform state law or federal law. First,
the uniform law process is administered by the ALI and the NCCUSL. Both
of these bodies have a demonstrated ability to identify and engage talented
drafters and informed professionals to participate in the drafting process.3 '
Second, because the ALI and NCCUSL are relatively obscure, the drafters
are able to engage in a careful deliberative process. 2 Third, the goal of
uniform adoption places a severe discipline on the uniform law drafters.
They must draft a statute that will survive the scrutiny of fifty state
legislatures. 5'
These strengths of the uniform law process are also its greatest
weaknesses. Just as the drafters' expertise and the insulation of the process
allow contemplative drafting, they also constrict the number of people and
groups that participate in the drafting process. While the scrutiny of fifty
state legislatures may produce a better statute, such scrutiny may have
detrimental effects as well. When the behavior of state legislatures is likely
to diverge from the public interest, either because of capture or because the
states' parochial interests diverge from the national interest, this scrutiny
may cause the uniform law drafters to facilitate capture or a race to the
bottom. In short, there are two forces that may lead to a failure of the
uniform law process: failure of representation "' at either the ALI/NCGUSL
51.

Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry Into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of

Private Legislatures, 29 Ga. L. Rev. 909, 921 (1995) ("[The uniform-law process] brings
together, in ways that an individual state legislature could not, experts from around the

country to pool their knowledge and ideas in the development of nationally uniform
statutes"); James J. White, Symposium, One Hundred Years of Uniform State Laws: Ex Proprio
Vigore, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 2096, 2096 (1991) [hereinafter White, Ex Proprio Vigore] ("Although
the Commissioners are technically public officials, they are an elite group. Most of the

Commissioners are prominent lawyers not chosen on the same basis used to choose a
legislator, but chosen because they have a more intellectual interest in uniform law than would
a typical legislator.").
52. See White, Ex Proprio Vigore, supra note 51, at 2096 ("[Commissioners] are elected
not by a vote of the electorate but by the single vote of the governor. This mode of election
doubtless removes the Commissioners further from the people than the typical state legislator
53. Id. ("These acts become the law of various states only ex proprio vigore--only if their
own vitality influences the legislators of the various states to pass them.").

54.

In an earlier draft I referred to this as a failure of "interest group representation."

Lynn LoPucki offered the following comment that has led me to change my terminology:
"'Failure of interest group representation' is bad? Most people would probably say it was
good." He goes on,
[You assume] a "public choice" perspective throughout. That is, the "polity" or

voting public does not exist. The world is composed solely of interest groups that
are perfectly cohesive and fight it out among themselves. But that is not the way the

world works. When the polls show that 60% of Americans think X, it is pretty likely
that the political system will favor X-regardless of who has a "collective-action

problem" and who does not.
Letter from Lynn LoPucki, Professor of Law, Cornell Univ., to author (June 12, 1997) (on file
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level or at the state level, and state competition in its pernicious form.
B. Capture
The ALI and NCCUSL are private or quasi-private organizations.
Nonetheless, these uniform law drafting bodies operate as private
legislatures. Legislatures are, from time to time, captured by the
representatives of special interests who then turn the public process of
legislation to their private ends. 5 Capture is often a product of a collectiveaction problem and is most likely when a legal rule affects both a small and
concentrated group and a large, diffuse group." Under these
with author) [hereinafter LoPucki Letter]. Although this point is very well taken, I think that it
is less true for the uniform law process than for other forms of representative government.
While most legislators are elected, the participants in the uniform law process are not. Their
goal is not to be reelected, but instead to have the code that they draft enacted. As discussed
below, the key to the enactability of a uniform law is to ensure that the electorate never
becomes conscious of the uniform law. See infra text accompanying notes 65, 79-85. Thus, the
relevant question for the uniform law drafter is not, "what does the public think?" but instead
"is the public likely to notice?" If the answer to the latter question is yes, then the instinct of
the drafters is likely to be to exclude the controversial provision from the uniform law.
When the public does notice, this is not necessarily bad. As Einer Elhauge has
pointed out, process cannot be completely divorced from substance. Einer R. Elhauge, Does
Interest Group TheoryJustify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 Yale LJ. 31, 109 (1991). For
example, one might argue with regard to tort claimants that they are amply represented by
the American Trial Lawyer's Association, yet they are unable to obtain a tort first priority. This
is likely because many, if not most, Americans think that the tort system is even more
fundamentally flawed than the secured credit system.
55. Indeed, when both a regulating agency and its supervising committee are captured
the result is referred to as an "iron triangle:"
mhese tripartite coalitions influence the allocation of government goods and
services in such a way that the congressional committee members get credit for
"bringing home the bacon" to their constituents, the administrative agencies
expand their budgets, personnel, and turf, and the interest groups get what they
want from government.
Daniel McCool, Command of the Waters 5 (1987); see also Martha Derthick & Paul J. Quirk,
The Politics of Deregulation 12-13 (1985) ("The general view was that a triumvirate (an 'iron
triangle') of regulators, regulated industries and key members of Congress, influenced by
campaign contributions from the regulated industries, constituted an insuperable barrier to
any reform that was contrary to industry interests.").
56. The phenomenon of "capture" was first described in connection with regulatory
agencies. George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci.
335 (1971) ("Regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily
for its benefit."); see also Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries: Hearings Before the Antitrust
Subcomm. of the House Judiciay Comm. on Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries, 84th Cong.
61-62 (1956) (testimony of Marver H. Bernstein, Associate Professor of Politics, Princeton
University, Princeton, N.J.) ("In the long run, a commission is forced to come to terms [with]
the regulated groups as a condition of its survival .... In their mature stage, their concept of
the public interest is hardly distinguishable from the views of the dominant regulated
interests."); George W. Hilton, The Basic Behaviorof Regulatory Commissions, 62 Am. Econ. Rev.
47 (1972). But legislative bodies are not immune from capture. Edward J. Janger, The FDIC's
Fraudulent Conveyance Power Under the Crime ControlAct of 1990: Bank Insolvency Lau' and the
Politics of the Iron Triangle,28 Conn. L. Rev. 67, 91-92 (1995).
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circumstances, the small and concentrated group can use its own
resources-votes, financial resources, and promises of future employmentto acquire rules favorable to itself and possibly detrimental to the larger,
diffuse group.
For example, when the costs of a proposed rule will be widely
distributed, any individual who seeks to challenge the rule will bear the full
cost of the challenge, while recovering only a pro-rata share of the benefit,
and even that individual will have an incentive to free ride on the efforts of
others. Therefore, unless the pro-rata benefit exceeds the cost of the
challenge, no individual will have an incentive to participate in the
legislative process. As a result, the affected group is likely to be
underrepresented. 57 Thus, when there is interest group asymmetry and a
rule that is distributive, the uniform law drafting process will likely be a
mechanisria for ensuring that benefits of the rule accrue to the smaller, wellorganized group. 58
1. Capture of the ALl and NCCUSL?
The product of the ALI/NCCUSL drafting process is a uniform law
that is designed to be adopted by fifty state legislatures. As such, capture of
the uniform law process is particularly troubling in that it can cause the
effective capture of fifty state legislatures. Indeed, there are a number of
reasons why the uniform law process may be more subject to capture than
state legislatures or Congress. First, as I have noted above, the process is
private. Second, the subject matter of uniform laws is often quite technical
and unlikely to hold the interest of anybody but an expert, an academic, or
a party with a well defined interest in the statutory outcome.5 9 Historically,
the ALl and NCCUSL have recognized these drawbacks and have sought to
limit the scope of the uniform law process to technical codification of the
law and to avoid efforts to enact social policy through uniform law
57. As I suggested in an earlier article:
For example, when the relevant outcome of the political process is a defense
expenditure, no individual taxpayer has an economic incentive to become involved
in the appropriation process. Only the defense contractor has sufficient stake in the
outcome to take an interest in the substance of legislation. Similarly, when the
legislative output is a regulation, only the regulated industry has a sufficient stake to
be a consistent player before the regulating process.
Janger, supra note 56, at 91-92.
58. As Mancur Olson has put it, "there is a systematic tendency for 'exploitation of the
great,' by the small." Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 29 (2d ed. 1971); see
generally Dennis Mueller, Public Choice II 309 (1988); Richard A. Posner, The Economic
Analysis of Law 524-37 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Posner, Economic Analysis]; Joseph Kalt &
Mark A-Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 279,

285 (1984) ("Any group's influence will depend positively on members' per capita stakes and
concentration of interests."); Fred McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic

Theory of Regulation, 16 J. Legal Stud. 101 (1987); Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade
Commission, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 47, 86 (1969); Stigler, supra note 56, at 335.
59. Patchel, supra note 38, at 132.
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drafting.6" Nonetheless, some uniform laws raise issues of social policy.
When they do, there is a risk of capture. An interested group, such as the
banking industry, may seek to turn the process to its own ends. When an
interest group succeeds, the insular nature of the process may make this
problem more difficult to identify and to correct. Thus, there is a risk of
capture whenever a uniform enactment creates a rule that benefits a
concentrated group at the expense of a diffuse group.
2. Lessons from Articles 3 and 4
A brief look at the history of Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC shows that
concerns about capture are not merely theoretical. Although Article 3 has
not engendered much dispute, Article 4 is a different story. On two separate
occasions, the Reporters chosen by the NCCUSL to draft Article 4 have
been summarily dismissed because they attempted to incorporate consumer
protection provisions into that Article. As Professor Rubin has noted, "The
drafting of [original] Article 3 went quite smoothly. [William] Prosser,
content to retain the basic structure and content of the [Negotiable
Instruments Law], simply refurbished the statute by resolving most of the
interpretive questions that had arisen during its half-century of existence.""
However, Fairfax Leary, the initial drafter of Article 4, was not so
lucky.
Leary produced a draft that represented a reconceptualization of
the field, and thus a significant departure from the American
Bankers Association's Bank Collection Code. It reflected a
thorough knowledge of the check collection process, and combined
a realistic recognition of industry needs with a rare sensitivity to
consumer interests. But the New York Clearing House Association
reacted with fury, promptly informing Llewellyn that it would
oppose the passage of the entire U.C.C. if Article 4 remained.
Llewellyn responded by relieving Leary of his duties, and
eliminating Article 4.62

A committee of bank counsel ultimately drafted Article 4, modeling it
closely on the Bank Collection Code.6"
A quarter century later, history repeated itself. In 1977, Harvard
Professor Hal Scott was appointed the Reporter for the revision of Articles
3, 4, and 8. Again, as Professor Rubin notes:
The New Payments Code was in trouble from the start. Although
many things had changed in the payments area, the New York
60. See Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the
Improvement of the Lau, Proposingthe Establishment of an American Lau,Institute, 1 A.L. Proc. 1,

4-5, 15 (1923).
61.
62.
63.

Rubin, Efficiency, Equity, supra note 3, at 554.
Id. at 555.
Id.

ARTICLE 9
Clearing House Association had not. Perceiving that the effort to
meld check, credit card, and electronic fund transfer law would
impose some of the consumer protection features of the federal
legislation on the checking system, it reacted with its accustomed
fury. Drafting continued and numerous changes were made, but
the sessions became increasingly acrimonious and the opposition of
the New York banks increasingly intense. With representatives of
the consumer movement also opposed because the Code seemed
dilute existing protection afforded for credit cards, and the
academic community bewildered or uninvolved, countervailing
support was nowhere to be found. After several years the ALI
dismissed Scott as reporter and announced the end of the entire
effort.""
Thus actual capture of the ALI/NCCUSL process is a real concern when a
uniform enactment has the potential to benefit an organized group at the
expense of a diffuse and disorganized group.
3. Uniformity and the Anticipation of Capture
Actual capture of the ALI/NCCUSL process is not the only manner in
which an interest group can gain disproportionate influence over the
uniform law drafting process. Because uniform law drafters seek universal
and uniform adoption, consensus is required. An interest group (even one
with very few, or even no votes in the drafting committee) may therefore be
able to obtain a desired result by merely making a plausible threat to block
enactment of the uniform law in one or a number of jurisdictions. 5 Thus,
when capture of state legislatures is a concern, the uniform law drafters may
need to act like a captured legislature in order to achieve uniform adoption.
This is particularly troubling when one recognizes that the principal
mechanism for preventing capture is to increase the representation of
affected groups in the legislative process. 6 Legislators may actively seek the
involvement of affected groups by soliciting their participation at hearings.
Regulators may try to reduce the costs associated with participation in the
regulatory process by using regulatory negotiation to encourage early and

64. Id. at 557-58. Professor Rubin ran into similar difficulties when he served as the chair
of the Article 3 and 4 subcommittee of the ABA's Ad Hoc Committee on Payment Systems. He
found that efforts to ensure that consumer interests were considered in the drafting process
were sufficiently controversial that he ultimately resigned his position. Rubin, Thinking Like a
Lawyer, supra note 38, at 781 ("It did not seem appropriate for me to lead the subcommittee
when my views diverged so markedly from those of the members, so I resigned my position as
chair in November of 1990.").
65.

Rubin, Efficiency, Equity, supra note 3, at 558; see also Kripke, supra note 1, at 327

("Difficult legislation like [the Code] without a popular appeal can seldom be passed without a
broad consensus of agreement of interested parties.").
66. Janger, supra note 56, at 105.
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effective participation by affected groups. 6 7 Because of the need for
uniformity, representation enhancement at the ALI/NCCUSL level will not
remedy the problem of anticipated capture. Even if all affected groups were
represented in the uniform law drafting process, this would not likely be the
case in the legislatures of the fifty states. Moreover, representation
enhancement in the legislatures of allfifty states is simply not feasible.
C. State Competition
A second reason that the uniform law process may fail, even in the
absence of capture, lies in the dynamics of federalism. Concern about a race
to the bottom may force the uniform law drafters to facilitate the adoption
of inefficient rules.
1. Lessons from Corporate Law Scholarship
The corporate law debate over the merits of state competition helps
explain how federalism may affect the content of uniform laws. Since the
1970s, corporate law scholars have sought to account for the overwhelming
number of corporations that choose to incorporate in the state of Delaware.
Three explanations have emerged: (1) the race to the bottom; (2) the race
to the top; and (3) the product approach. 8
The race-to-the-bottom theory views state competition for corporate
charters as a malevolent force. Professor William Cary pointed out that
Delaware, by all accounts the victor in the interstate competition for
corporate charters, is also at the forefront in relaxing corporate law
restraints on managerial discretion.6 9 According to Cary, Delaware's
legislators recognize that corporate managers make the incorporation
decision and that Delaware can woo these corporate decisionmakers by
adopting rules that favor managers over shareholders. Although the
shareholders nominally control the company, they face a collective-action
problem. Shares in public companies are often widely held. Therefore
individual shareholders have no incentive, and are not in a position, to
actively monitor the behavior of the officers.7" Under Cary's account,
Delaware's legislators also recognize that, for the most part, the citizens of
Delaware do not bear the costs of these decisions in the form of reduced
share value. Delaware legislators can therefore use liberal corporate law to
curry favor with their constituents, such as local citizens, who benefit from
franchise taxes, and lawyers in Wilmington who specialize in corporate law.
Therefore, according to Cary, federal regulation of corporate governance is
necessary. 7'
67. Id. at 105-06.
68. Bebchuck, Federalism,supra note 45, at 1444-45; Charny, supra note 45, at 430-33.
69. Cary, supra note 43, at 665-66.
70. The rise of mutual funds that represent large aggregates of shareholders may
alleviate this problem somewhat.
71. Cary,supranote 43, at 701.
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Race-to-the-top theorists, such as Judge Frank Easterbrook and
Professor Daniel Fischel,7 2 argue, by contrast, that Cary's view ignores the
market for corporate control, which operates to discipline managers who act
opportunistically. If managers are acting inefficiently, their self-interested
behavior will depress the value of the corporation's stock. If investors
recognize that the stock is undervalued, the company will become a
takeover target. Once purchased, the new owners will replace the
opportunistic managers. Like the race-to-the-bottom theorists, the race-tothe-top theorists recognize that Delaware wins in the competition for state
charters because of its liberal corporate law rules. The race-to-the-top
theorists, however, conclude that Delaware's victory in the race occurs
because these same rules are efficient and operate to enhance the value of
the company.
Finally, a third group of scholars has sought to explain Delaware's
victory as a race for predictability and stability." Although Delaware may be
a leader in the liberalization of corporate law, these scholars note that many
jurisdictions, in order to compete with Delaware, have adopted corporate
laws that are very similar to those of Delaware. Nonetheless, Delaware has
remained the incorporation champion. Professor Roberta Romano argues
that Delaware's corporate law must be viewed not just in terms of the
substantive law, but in terms of the whole "product": Delaware has an
experienced corporate law bar; the bench is small and familiar with
corporate law issues; and, lastly, the corporation code can only be amended
by a two-thirds vote of both houses of the state legislature."
Recently, Professor Lucian Bebchuck has offered a hybrid theory that
attempts to reconcile all three explanations and to incorporate them into a
unified model.7 5 He points out that different corporate law rules are
attractive to corporate managers for different reasons. Some rules attract
incorporation decisions for efficiency-based, value-creating reasons (race to
the top), some attract incorporation because they are well-drafted and
consistently interpreted by the judiciary of that jurisdiction (product), and
others may attract incorporation because they transfer
value to managers at
76
the expense of shareholders (race to the bottom).
Bebchuck argues that each of these three explanations will apply to
some legal rules, but not others. He views competition among states as a
72. See Easterbrook, supra note 41, at 540 ("[E]vidence suggests the power of competition
and existing arrangements in protecting investors."); Fischel, supra note 41, at 921 (arguing
that the absence of regulation allows "private parties to enter into contractual arrangements
that they find mutually advantageous"); see also Dodd & Leftwich, supra note 41, at 259
(arguing that the race to the top will help shareholders achieve greater than average returns);
Winter, supra note 41, at 251 (arguing that "state corporate legal systems are protective of
shareholders").
73.

See generally Romano, supra note 45, at 225; Romano, The State Competition Debate in

CorporateLaw, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 709 (1987).
74. Romano, supra note 45, at 273-78.
75. Bebchuck, Federalism,supra note 45, at 1440.
76.

Id.
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good thing, most of the time. States will experiment and seek to adopt rules
that are either substantively efficient or that constitute a superior product.
Ordinarily, these rules will attract corporations because they are valuecreating, and this will produce a "race to the top." Bebchuck then identifies
two types of rules that will cause race to the bottom type problems: (1) rules
that increase agency costs (i.e., increase intrafirm externalities); and (2)
rules that create interstate externalities.77
A corporate agency problem arises when corporate managers act in
their own interests rather than in the interests of the shareholders. First,
because managers control the incorporation decision, the race to the
bottom will operate when a rule allows managers to capture value from
shareholders. Second, a rule that limits market discipline will exacerbate
this problem by further insulating corporate managers. 8 Third, when a rule
allows dominant shareholders to gain advantage at the expense of minority
shareholders, the discipline of the market over managers and majority
shareholders (who, after all, owe a duty to minority shareholders) will be
further diluted.79 In each of these categories, the rule that increases agency
costs has distributive consequences that benefit a group with control over
the incorporation decision. Attempts by states to use these types of rules to
attract corporations will cause a race to the bottom.
An opportunity for interstate externality exists if Delaware can adopt a
rule that will benefit Delaware corporations at the expense of the citizens of,
say, Oklahoma. Such a statute, which is not value-creating, and exists solely
to transfer wealth from citizens of one state to citizens of another is not
socially desirable. Such a rule will, however, maximize shareholder value for
Delaware corporations. When a corporation decides to incorporate in
Delaware to take advantage of such a rule, the decision will not be driven by
an agency problem (or intrafirm externality), but by the ability of Delaware
to benefit shareholders in Delaware corporations at the expense of citizens
of other states. s° A number of corporate law rules fall into this category,
such as regulation of takeover and proxy contests, protection of creditors,
disclosure obligations, protection of constituencies other than providers of
capital such as employees and consumers, and rules that reflect goals such

77.

Id. at 1484.

78. As noted above, the race-to-the-top theory is predicated on the assumption that the
market for corporate control will operate to discipline errant corporate managers. Under this
view, antitakeover legislation that protects entrenched corporate managers is likely to be a

product of a race to the bottom.
79.
80.

Bebchuck, Federalism,supra note 45, at 1484.
One might argue that many shareholders in Delaware corporations will likely live out

of state. These shareholders will have an interest in preventing the corporation from taking
advantage of the ability to impose costs across state lines. Here, however, the problem of

interstate externality becomes a form of intrafirm externality. Now Delaware-corporation
shareholders will face both information problems (they won't know what the corporation is

doing to harm them) and a collective-action problem. As a result, out-of-state shareholders are
unlikely to be able to prevent a race to the bottom.
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as protection of the environment."
2. Anticipated State Competition as a Driving Force in Uniform Law
Drafting
At first blush, it is difficult to see how state competition for corporate
charters bears on the uniform law process. After all, the entire point of the
uniform law project is to eliminate state competition by creating a law that
all states will adopt. Such concerns do enter this discussion through the back
door. The uniform law drafters wish to ensure that the statute they prepare
will be widely adopted. They must therefore draft a statute where state
competition will not induce states to enact nonuniform versions of the
code. 2 On the one hand, this competition will encourage drafters to
produce a good product-a statute that is well drafted and substantively
superior to competing nonuniform laws regulating the same subject matter.
However, they must also anticipate the likely results of interstate
competition and neutralize it. In the uniform law drafting process, the
desire for universal and uniform adoption drives the drafters to predict and
follow the direction that state competition will lead. If state competition will
encourage a race to the top, the drafters will be driven to create an efficient
rule. But if competition will yield a race to the bottom, the drafters, if they
are to preserve uniformity, must scrape the bottom as well.
Thus, the dynamics of federalism will play a large role in the drafters'
deliberations. The Revisers' concern will not turn on the desirability or
undesirability of a particular rule, but instead on whether the rule will pose
a threat to uniform enactment of the proposed law. It is therefore crucial to
determine which rules are more likely to be subject to race to the top type
pressures and which are more likely to generate a race to the bottom. Here,
Bebchuck's categories are helpful.
According to Bebchuck, a race to the bottom is likely when a rule
creates a principal-agent problem. The agency problem in corporate law
turns on the ability of managers to exploit a state's corporate law rules to
capture value from shareholders. In corporate law, corporate managers act
as "agents" of the shareholders. The agency problem exists because
shareholders of a publicly held company face a collective-action problem
and cannot effectively monitor opportunistic behavior by corporate
managers. Again, this agency problem would not appear to apply to efforts
to revise Article 9. Corporate managers are not agents of creditors in a legal
sense.' This does not mean that an agency problem does not exist.
Economists do not use the term "agency" in the same way that lawyers do.
A corporate officer need not be an "agent" of the shareholders in the legal
sense for there to be an "agency" problem in the economic sense. As
81.

Bebchuck, Federalism,supra note 45, at 1494-96.

82. See White, Ex Proprio Vigore, supra note 51, at 2131 (describing forces that
contribute to nonuniform adoption).
83. LoPucki Letter, supra note 54.
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Easterbrook has noted, the reason that shareholders are given the power to
control a corporation is that they are residual claimants. The logic is that
any action that helps the residual claimant will increase the value of all
claims against the enterprise. ' 4 Where the shareholders can inflict costs on
fixed claimants this logic breaks down. Perhaps a more precise way of
describing the "agency" problem would be to describe it as a conflict of
interest between an empowered corporate constituency (i.e., management)
and a disempowered corporate constituency (i.e., minority shareholders or
creditors). More precise, but also more jargony, would be to call it a
"negative intrafirm externality.""5 The problem of intrafirm externality
exists whenever there is a conflict of interest between corporate managers
and one corporate constituency that cannot make its voice heard.
When a uniform law has the effect of enhancing such an intrafirm
externality, the drafters will be forced to anticipate a race to the bottom.
This will occur any time that a legal rule (even one that does not deal
directly with corporate governance) allows one corporate constituency to
seize value from a corporate constituency that is either disenfranchised by
corporate law or that faces a collective-action problem. As discussed below,
the rule of full priority in Article 9 falls into this category because it allows
shareholders and managers to alter the risk faced by nonconsensual and
nonadjusting creditors.'
Similarly, if one state can place the costs of an inefficient rule on the
citizens of another state, there is an incentive for that state to benefit home
state corporations by adopting that inefficient rule. Delaware benefits from
the incorporation, while most of the shareholders who are harmed are
residents of other states. The only way for the uniform law process to
prevent nonuniform adoption in such a case is to make that inefficient rule
part of the uniform law. Again, as discussed below, Article 9 falls into this
category because it may allow Delaware citizens to benefit from corporate
law rules that harm the citizens of distant states.
D. The ProperDomain of the Uniform Law Process: Towards a Decision Rule for
Selective Abstention

This analysis suggests that there are advantages to using the uniform
law process to legislate in certain areas. The need to obtain uniform
adoption will encourage the drafters to enact a statute that is widely
acceptable and may effectuate a race to the top. However, this analysis also
suggests a decision rule that may help to decide in advance which questions
should be handled through the uniform law process and which questions
84.

Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L & Econ.

395, 403 (1983); see also Frank H. Easterbrook &Daniel R.Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law 11 (1991).

85, See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
86. This conflict exists because the shareholders can use secured credit to increase the
risk faced by nonadjusting creditors, without paying a corresponding risk premium. See infra
notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
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can more effectively be dealt with by other lawmaking bodies. Because the
uniform law process appears to have both relative advantages and
disadvantages over the federal and nonuniform law drafting processes, it
might seem wise to self-consciously adopt an approach of selective
abstention." When there is no reason to expect the uniform law process to
fail, it should be allowed to function and do what it does well. However,
when capture, anticipated capture, or an anticipated race to the bottom are
likely to drive the uniform law process, the ALI/NCCUSL should decline to
regulate the area and leave the question to federal law or nonuniform state
law. In the alternative, ALI/NCCUSL could adopt a rule in the absence of a
federal or state rule, but indicate that the matter would better be handled by
nonuniform legislation."8
Thus, there are two types of rules that are likely to lead to failure of the
uniform law process: rules that are likely to cause the drafters to anticipate
and facilitate the capture of state legislatures, and rules that are likely to
cause the drafters to anticipate and facilitate a race to the bottom. In sum,
the uniform law process can be expected to fail when it seeks to create
(1) rules that are distributive between political constituencies,
when either the benefitted or burdened interest group (but
not both) faces a collective-action problem; or
(2)
(a) rules that are distributive between corporate
constituencies, when either the benefitted or burdened
corporate constituency (but not both) faces a collectiveaction problem or otherwise lacks a voice in the
corporate decisionmaking process; or
(b) rules that allow citizens of, and businesses located in,
one state to impose costs on citizens of other states.
Rules in the first category are likely to be subject to capture or anticipated
capture, while rules in the second category are likely to be subject to an
anticipated race to the bottom. In either case, there is reason to believe that
federal or nonuniform state legislation will produce a better legislative
product.

87. Indeed, Steven Nickles argued that it might have made sense to merge the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission and the Drafting Committee for Revised Article 9 so that the
system could be viewed as a whole. Steven H. Nickles, Consider Process Before Substance,
Commercial Law Consequences of the Bankruptcy System: Urging the Merger of the Article 9 Drafting
Committee and the Bankruptcy Commission, 69 Am. Bankr. LJ. 589, 595-96 (1995).

88. The NCCUSL already follows this practice with regard to model acts. These are acts
where the drafters have concluded that the act embodies policy choices that may not be
suitable for all states. If selective abstention is to work, it must be carried out in a forthright
and self-conscious fashion. When certain provisions are excluded from a uniform law for
"selective abstention" reasons, it should be made clear that the decision not to include, for
example, consumer protection provisions in Revised Article 4, does not reflect on the merits

of such proposals, but is driven by the inability of the uniform law process to incorporate such
provisions.
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II. EVALUATING THE DECISION RULE: THE ARTICLE 9 REVISION-WHAT IT
DOES AND DOESN'T Do

Having articulated the decision rule, the next task is to demonstrate
that it has explanatory power. This Part contrasts the response of the
Revisers of Article 9 to two different types of proposals: (1) proposals
directed at the safety of secured credit (in the form of risk alteration and
consumer protection); and (2) proposals that respond to technological
change.
A. The Article 9 Revision and ProposalsThat Respond.to the Distributive

Consequences of Secured Credit
Professors Warren, LoPucki, Bebchuck and Fried have made a number
of proposals aimed at controlling the third-party effects of secured credit.8 9
In contrast to the Reviser's reaction to proposals which address
technological change,' the response has been vehement. Critics have
attacked the theoretical and empirical bases for these proposals along with
their practicality. The Revisers have proposed no changes to Article 9 to
address concerns over the third-party effects of secured credit. This Part
develops the argument for the Warren Proposal and describes the Revisers'
response. Readers who are familiar with the debate may wish to skip to Part
II.A.3.c.

1. Distributive Consequences of Secured Credit: Common-Law Recognition
and the UCC's Response
The distributive consequences of secured credit are not a recent
discovery. Article 9 is unique among the articles of the Uniform
Commercial Code in that it is devoted to facilitating, and indeed
encouraging, a practice that both English and American courts viewed first
as a felony9' and later as a civil fraud. 2 Until the advent of the statutory
precursors to Article 9 in the late nineteeth century, common-law courts
viewed nonpossessory interests in personal property as a fraud upon
creditorsY These courts took the view that, by separating ownership and
possession (thereby creating a secret lien), debtors could deceive future
creditors and harm existing creditors. These judges feared that potential
89. See Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 18, at 904; LoPucki, Bargain, supra note 18, at
1908-09; Warren, Proposal,supra note 18, at 1.

90. See infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
91. Statute of 13 Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570); Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng.
Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).
92. Clow v. Woods, 5 Sergeant & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819).
93.

Id.
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creditors would look at the assets in the debtor's possession and assume that
they would be available (upon levy and execution) to satisfy the creditor's
claims.' Even more troubling, debtors on the brink of bankruptcy could use
nonpossessory property interests to prefer one creditor over another, or to
protect their assets from execution by the sheriff.
For example, in Twyne's Case,95 the debtor, Pierce, owed Twyne £400.
Pierce also owed £200 to C. C sued Pierce and obtained a judgment.
Pending the writ, Pierce conveyed all of his property to Twyne in
satisfaction of the larger debt. Twyne continued in possession of the
property, however, and remained in business. The Star Chamber found the
conveyance to be fraudulent. Thus, the early judicial hostility to
nonpossessory security interests, while characterized in terms of fraud,
rested on a recognition that nonpossessory security interests in personal
property could have undesirable distributive consequences.
Over time, however, a different response developed. Creditors
contrived, and courts and legislatures recognized, a number of common-law
and statutory security devices, such as chattel mortgages, field warehouses,
and trust receipts. Courts would recognize certain nonpossessory property
interests so long as the "secured" creditor or debtor took steps to notify
other creditors of the property interest.' By requiring some form of notice,
courts, ameliorated the problem of fraud, and to some extent, the risk of
debtor misbehavior. Early lenders could protect themselves from later
creditors either by insisting on collateral themselves or by insisting on
negative covenants, under which the debtor would promise not to incur
further secured debt. Though simple in concept, implementation of this
principle was far from perfect. A congeries of security devices and notice
mechanisms developed that made it difficult for secured creditors to
determine how to perfect their property interest and for prospective
unsecured creditors to determine97 which assets would be available to general
creditors in the event of default.
94.

Id.

95. 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).
96. For a discussion of pre-Code security devices, see Grant Gilmore, Security Interests in
Personal Property 5-195 (1965).
97. The official conment to section 9-101 provides:
Pre-Code law recognized a wide variety of security devices, which came into use at
various times to make possible different types of secured financing.
Differences between one device and another persisted, in formal requisites, in

the secured party's rights against the debtor and third parties, in the debtor's rights
against the secured party, and in filing requirements, although many of those

differences no longer served any useful function. Thus an unfiled chattel mortgage
was by the law of many states "void" against creditors generally; a conditional sale,
often available as a substitute for the chattel mortgage, was in some states valid
against all creditors without filing, and in states where filing is required was, if
unfiled, void only against lien creditors. The recognition of so many separate
security devices had the result that half a dozen filing systems covering chattel
security devices might be maintained in a state ....

The growing complexity of financing transactions forced legislatures to keep
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The genius of Article 9 was that it identified a simple solution to the
problem of the secret lien and to the problem of multiple security devices
and filing systems-the unitary security interest and the Article 9 filing
system. In one stroke, Article 9 replaced a wide variety of cumbersome
devices, filing systems, ad hoc notice requirements, and much of the law of
pledge with a relatively straightforward system of notice filing 98 and a
simple set of priority principles. 9 Indeed, the basic outline of Article 9 "can
be summarized in a few sentences[:] ''"" °
A security interest is

. .

.a priority right that is linked to specific

collateral. A creditor who takes a nonpossessory security interest
creates an ostensible ownership problem and should presumptively
have a duty to cure it by making a public filing. The public filing,
however, need only give notice that the secured creditor has or in
the future may take an interest in particular types of collateral.
There is no duty to record the details of the transaction. Finally, a
creditor who acts in good faith and cures the ostensible ownership
problem has the right to take a security interest in the personal
property of the debtor.'
By devising this straightforward mechanism for curing the ostensible
piling new statutory provisions on top of our inadequate and already sufficiently
complicated nineteenth-century structure of security law. The results of this
continuing development were increasing costs to both parties and increasing
uncertainty as to their rights and the rights of third parties dealing with them.
The aim of this Article is to provide a simple and unified structure within which
the immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions can go forward
with less cost and with greater certainty.
U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt.(1995).
98, Of course, simplicity is in the eyes of the beholder. While certainly an improvement
over what came before, the filing of notice to perfect a security interest remains an expensive
and cumbersome part of any secured transaction. In a report to the Uniform Commercial
Code Article 9 Filing System Task Force to the Permanent Editorial Board's Article 9 Study
Committee, Meredith Jackson analyzed over 100 legal bills generated by the law firm of
Binghaim, Dana and Gould, and concluded that in a typical transaction the legal fees
associated with the filing system would constitute 5.52% of the bill. Thus for a transaction
where the legal fees were $467,100, $25,000 would be attributable to the filing system. Alces,
supra note 17, at 691-92.
99. Again, simplicity is in the eyes of the beholder. While the basic principle of priority is
that the first to file properly, or to take possession, takes priority over those who perfect their
security interest later in time, U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1995), there are a number of parties who
may take priority over the first to file, such as holders of purchase money security interests, id.
§§ 9.312(4) & (5), or parties who have filed improperly but whose interests are known to the
first to file, id. § 9-401(2). These rules can create circular priorities and other uncertainties. As
a result, Professor White has advocated limiting many of these exceptions to the first-in-time
rule. White, supra note 33, at 535 ("As a touchstone against which to measure proposals for
priority and in the face of our ignorance about the state of the parties' motivations and
intentions, Istart with the hypothesis that the first to file should defeat all others, both those
coming before and those coming after.").
100. Baird, supra note 17, at 2249.
101. Id.
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ownership problem, °2 Article 9 improved the lot of both secured and
unsecured creditors. Article 9 reduced the secured creditor's cost of
perfecting a nonpossessory interest in personal property, and it eased the
unsecured creditor's task of learning about existing interests in collateral by
reducing the number of files to be searched. 3 By paying a small filing fee
and filing a half-page form in a public office, a secured creditor could put
prospective lenders on notice of an ownership interest in the debtor's
asset(s). By searching those files, potential creditors could learn of any
existing encumbrances.
Having "solved" the so-called "problem of ostensible ownership," ' l
the debate over the distributive consequences of secured credit moved to
the background and lost both its urgency and force. Solution of the notice
problem allowed the uses and forms of security interests to be determined
under a regime of freedom of contract.
2. Concerns Persist
a. Misgivings Expressed in Article 9

The discussion, however, did not go away completely. The drafters of
Article 9 themselves articulated some reservations about the wisdom of
floating liens on inventory and equipment. In the Official Comment to
section 9-204, Gilmore and Dunham attributed the common law suspicion
of the floating lien to the view that any debtor should maintain a cushion of
unencumbered assets to satisfy unsecured claims. 0 5 Article 9 rejected this
position, "not on the grounds of policy, but on the ground that it was not
effective."'0 6 Commercial reality had overtaken the law. Demand for secured
102. Id.
103. Although it was still necessary for the debtor to determine which state's files to search,
Article 9 sought to limit the number of state files to search by adopting the uniform choice-oflaw rule contained in section 9-103. While this section has engendered a fair amount of
confusion, it was still an improvement over having to search the chattel mortgage files, trust
receipts files, fixture files and other files in any of a number of jurisdictions with widely
divergent filing systems.
104. Baird, supra note 17, at 2249.
105. The current debate over the Warren Proposal might be viewed as a re-emergence of
the debate over the need for just such an equity cushion. Cf. Warren, Proposal,supra note 18, at
1 ("As I recall the debate [at the Council meeting of December 1996], the operative metaphor
was that the new proposals permitted the secured creditors 'to plow the comers of the field.'
The Article 9 drafting committee was unwilling to draft a proposal that insured that some
assets would remain for unsecured creditors in the event of the debtor's failure.").
106. U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 2 (1995). That comment provides:
This Article accepts the principle of a "continuing general lien." It rejects the
doctrine-of which the judicial attitude toward after-acquired property interests was
one expression-that there is reason to invalidate as a matter of law what has been
variously called the floating charge, the freehanded mortgage and the lien on a
shifting stock. This Article validates a security interest in the debtor's existing and
future assets, even though... the debtor has liberty to use or dispose of collateral
without being required to account for proceeds or substitute new collateral....
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financing had found a way over or around each attempted road block.' 7
Gilmore and Dunham decided to give in to the inevitable. Their hope was
that the filing system would reduce the risk of harm by putting potential
creditors on notice of a security interest in future as well as present
collateral." 8 The potential creditor could then choose whether or not to
extend credit with a more accurate picture of the assets that would be
available in the event of default. By solving the notice problem, Article 9
eliminated"° ' the need for an "equity cushion."
b. Gilmore's Challenge
Even with the filing system in place, however, Professor Gilmore
continued to worry that notice did not eliminate all of the problematic
consequences of secured credit. In 1981, not long before his death, Gilmore
mused:
i"here was something worth thinking about in the limitations that
the nineteenth-century courts had placed on the mortgagee's claim
to after-acquired property: does it make any sense to award everything
to a secured party who stands idly by while a doomed enterprisegoes down
the slippery slope into bankruptcy?"o

Gilmore was troubled by the power of the device he and his colleagues had
created. Although Article 9 took the rule of full priority for secured claims
from pre-Code law, it institutionalized the ability to take a security interest
in after-acquired property and allowed the priority of future advances to
relate back to the date of an earlier filing."' As a result, a secured creditor
The widespread nineteenth century prejudice against the floating charge was
based on a feeling, often inarticulate in the opinions, that a commercial borrower
should not be allowed to encumber all his assets present and future, and that for
the protection not only of the borrower but of his other creditors a cushion of free
assets should be preserved. That inarticulatepremise has much to recommend it. This
Article decisively rejects it not on the ground that it was urong in policy but on the ground
that it was not effective .... In almost every state it was possible before the Code for

the borrower to give a lien on everything he held or would have. There have no
doubt been sufficient economic reasons for the change. This Article, in expressly
validating the floating charge, merely recognizes an existing state of things. The
substantive rules of law set forth in the balance of the Article are designed to
achieve the protection of the debtor and the equitable resolution of the conflicting
claims of creditors which the old rules no longer give.
Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. The principal substantive rules mentioned in the last sentence of the official comment
to section 9-204 are the perfection rules contained most notably in sections 9-302 to 9-305,
and the filing rules contained in sections 9-401 to 9-403. Under Article 9's priority rules, a
security interest does not take priority over the claims of third parties (unsecured creditors)
unless the creditor has perfected the security interest by taking possession, or by filing a notice
of the security interest in the appropriate place. U.C.C §§ 9-301, 9-312.
109. Or, so it was hoped.
110. Gilmore, Good Faith Purchase,supra note 6, at 627.
111.

U.C.C. §§ 9-204, 9-312 (1995).
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could perfect a security interest in virtually all of the debtor's property.
Moreover, this could be done cheaply and with confidence. The harsh
consequences of the rule of full priority on certain types of creditors were
the source of Gilmore's concerns. These consequences can best be
understood through an example.
Farginkles, a department store, files a bankruptcy petition. At a
hearing, on or shortly after the petition date, the lawyer for the debtor-inpossession reports to the bankruptcy judge that the debts of the estate total
$40,000,000. Furthermore, the debtor's principal secured creditor holds
$20,000,000 of those claims and has a perfected," 2 unavoidable,"' first
priority4 lien on all of the debtor's real" 5 and personal property. The
attorney states that the assets of the corporation are valued at $19,000,000.
Therefore, says the attorney, "there will be no distribution to
unsecured creditors."" 6 Accordingly, he requests the court's permission to
abandon the debtor's assets to the secured creditor for the purpose of
liquidation." 7 The court, after an evidentiary hearing, concludes that the
lawyer's estimate of the value of the debtor's assets is, if anything, generous,
and grants the debtor's motion to abandon. At the end of the day, thes
secured creditor is paid 95% of its claim out of the sale of its collateral,"
and the other claimants receive nothing.' These claimants include trade
creditors, suppliers, employees with pension claims, retirees with medical
benefits and others. These creditors may also include tort claimants such as
employees injured on the job (to the extent that their injuries are not
covered by workers' compensation), customers injured on the premises, and
so on.
For Gilmore, these consequences mandated a second look at secured
credit. Until recently, however, Gilmore's misgivings about the harm caused
by cheap and easy secured credit remained just that-a gut reaction that
something was amiss, without a theory to explain the scope or dimension of
the problem. With the notice problem solved, the consequences of Article
9-that secured creditors received more in bankruptcy than unsecured
creditors-could be defended on grounds of freedom of contract. The rule
112.

Id. § 9-302.

113.

11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548, 549 (1994).

114.

U.G.C. §§ 9-301, 9-312 (1995).

115. This would be subject to nonuniform real estate law, but in every jurisdiction could be
accomplished by recording a mortgage in the appropriate land records.
116. Under § 544, the trustee in bankruptcy has the status of a hypothetical lien creditor
as of the date of the petition. As such, property enters the estate subject to any property
interests that were perfected prior to the date of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 544. Therefore, if
the value of perfected liens against the debtor's property exceeds the value of that property,
all property will be used to satisfy the secured claims and no property will be left over to satisfy
unsecured claims.
117. "After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that
is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate." 11
U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994).
118. $19,000/$20,000=0.95

119.

$20,000>$19,000.
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of full priority merely held the unsecured creditor to the terms of his or her
bargain. 2 ' Gilmore's
concerns could be dismissed as mere soft2
heartedness.' '

3. Explaining Secured Credit: The Efficiency v. Inefficiency Explanations
Gilmore's question had two components: (1) what social policy is
served by secured credit; and (2) is anybody harmed by secured credit?
Lurking in the background was the question of whether the social costs of
secured credit outweighed the benefits. Because freedom of contract,
coupled with notice, seemed on its face to eliminate any significant costs,
the search for an answer focused on identifying the policy served by secured
credit.
a. Benefits? The Puzzle of Secured Credit
So long as freedom of contract provided a complete response to
concerns about the costs of secured credit, relatively weak rationales could
be tolerated; and weak explanations were all that emerged.
(1) The Puzzle
Even before the search for an answer to Gilmore's question began in
earnest, it ran into trouble. Alan Schwartz looked to finance theory and
articulated what has become known as the "Puzzle of Secured Credit."' 22 He
looked to the work of economists Ando Modigliani and Merton Miller' 23
and argued that the prevalence of secured credit was a mystery. Modigliani
and Miller argued, in the late 1950s, that altering the capital structure of a
corporate entity should not change its value. Creditors will simply adjust the
interest rate charged for debt and the amount they will pay for an equity
interest in the company to reflect the riskiness of the investment. These
adjustments thereby offset any benefit. Put another way, a firm cannot not
alter its average cost of capital by altering its capital structure. 4
Again an example may be useful. Assume that General Amusements
120.
121.

See generally Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy (1986).
Indeed, the Revisers have sought to caricature Gilmore and others who raise concerns

about the rule of full priority by suggesting that they are part of a movement that they call

"Sympathetic Legal Studies," driven by misguided compassion for those who lose out under
Article 9's priority scheme. These latter-day followers of Gilmore are collectively, and
somewhat uncharitably, referred to as "symps." Harris & Mooney, supra note 3, at 2045-47.
122. Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 Vand. L Rev. 1051 (1984)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Continuing Puzzle]; Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy
Priorities: A Review ofCurrent Theories, 10J. Legal Stud. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Schwartz, Puzzle];
Alan Schwartz, A Theoy of Loan Priorities, 18J. Legal Stud. 209 (1989) [hereinafter Schwartz,
Theory].
123. Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261 (1958).

124. See id. at 268 (arguing that "the market value of any firm is independent of its capital
structure").
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makes Whoopie Cushions@. Whoopie Cushions@ sell for $5.00 each.
General Amusements can produce 1000 Whoopie Cushions@ per week (fifty
weeks per year as the factory closes for a week at Christmas, and for a week
during the summer), and Whoopie Cushions@ cost $4.00 each to produce.
General Amusements presently carries $100,000 in unsecured debt on
which it pays five percent annual interest.
Vinyl Products offers to sell General Amusements a new Whoopie
Cushion@-making machine for $100,000. The machine will have a useful
life of ten years and will allow General Amusements to produce an extra
200 Whoopie Cushions@ per week at a cost of $3.50 per Whoopie
Cushion@. General Amusements does not believe that this increase in
production will affect the market price.
If the machine is treated as a bond producing an income stream
totaling $150,000 over ten years 25 on an investment of $100,000, and
General Amusements can borrow at a rate of five percent, this is a bad
investment. Assuming that a balloon payment is due at the end of the
period, the company would have had to spend approximately $163,000126
to make an investment that produced only $150,000.
Further assume, however, that General Amusements has an
opportunity to borrow at a lower interest rate, say four percent, on a
secured basis. At first blush this would appear to alter the economics of the
deal, reducing the total outlay to approximately $148,000 over the same
period. 127 However, under Modigliani and Miller's irrelevance hypothesis
(known simply as MM to finance graduate students), this ability to borrow,
however, at a lower interest rate would not turn a bad investment into a
good one. By charging certain assets to pay the equipment lender, General
Amusements would increase the riskiness of the investment of its existing
unsecured creditors. As a result, assuming perfect information and costless
immediate adjustment, the firm's other lenders would no longer be willing
to lend at five percent and would require a risk premium. Under Modigliani
and Miller's calculus, the risk premium would offset the reduction in
interest rate made possible by borrowing on a secured basis. The company's
average cost of capital would remain five percent, and the bad investment
would remain a bad investment.
Modigliani and Miller offer the analogy to milk. A farmer cannot
increase the amount in the bucket by dividing whole milk into skim milk

125.

Over 10 years, the machine will produce an extra 100,000 Whoopie Cushions

(200(cushions)*50(weeks)*10(years)).
(100,OOO*$1.50=$150,000).
126.

The

profit

on

each

The formula for compound interest is: Vn=P(1+i)", where

Vn=value at the end of n years,
P=principal amount deposited or invested,
i=interest rate per year, and
n=number of years.
Therefore, $162,889.46=$ 00,000(I+.05)Io.
127. $148,024.43=$100,000(1+.04)1o.

cushion

will

be

$1.50
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and cream. 2 Finance graduate students like to use pizza, pointing out that
one cannot increase the size of a pizza by cutting it into smaller pieces. 129 If
the so-called "Modigliani and Miller Irrelevance Hypothesis" is correct,
argues Schwartz, debtors have no interest rate based reason to offer security
to their lenders.
From the perspective of social policy, this is troubling. Secured credit
is a common form of lending and one that entails certain costs to both the
lender and the borrower. The lender must take the trouble to perfect its
security interest. The borrower may limit its access to credit in the fture by
encumbering assets. Why do debtors and creditors choose in such great
numbers to bear these costs? Two possibilities present themselves. Either
secured credit produces efficiencies, in which case it should be encouraged,
or it imposes costs on third parties, in which case it is an institution that
should be discouraged.
(2) Attempted Efficiency-Based Solutions to the Puzzle
The principal efficiency-based responses to Professors Gilmore and
Schwartz turn on monitoring costs."O In many instances, it is very costly for
a creditor to monitor the activities and creditworthiness of a debtor's entire
enterprise. It is cheaper simply to monitor a single asset.' In addition,
because creditors will face a collective-action problem and the resulting
incentive to free ride,3 2 a suboptimal level of monitoring will occur.
Secured credit, it is argued, provides a mechanism for creditors to divide up
the monitoring task in an efficient way. Creditors simply choose the assets
that they are in the best position to monitor and worry about those assets
alone. For this reason, the cost savings associated with reduced monitoring
costs will benefit all of the debtor's claimants.' 3 The free rider problem is
thus conquered, as is the problem of duplication of effort."
128, Modigliani & Miller, supra note 123, at 277.
129. This is based on a nonsystematic survey of the two business school graduates that I
know best (both of whom have the misfortune to be my younger brothers).
130. Professors Thomas H. Jackson and Anthony T. Kronman offered the monitoring cost
explanation shortly before Gilmore and Schwartz asked their questions in print. Thomas H.
Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financingand PrioritiesAmong Creditors, 88 Yale LJ.
1143 (1979). One suspects, however, that Gilmore had been asking his students these
questions for some time.
131. Id.at1153.
132. Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeridersin Commercialand CorporateSettings, 92 Yale LJ.
49, 57-58 (1982). A collective-action problem exists whenever private markets are relied on to
provide public goods, such as street lamps and national defense. A public good is a good
where there is jointness of supply (one person's use of the good does not diminish the ability
of another to use it), and nonexcludability (one user cannot exclude another user). In such a
case, each user of the good has an incentive to free ride. See Mueller, supra note 58, at 308-10;
Olson, supra note 58, at 29; Janger, supra note 56, at 89-90.
133. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 130, at 1149-61; see also Paul M. Shupack, Solving the
Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 1067, 1074-75 (1989) (describing Jackson
and Kronman's theory of monitoring costs).
134. Levmore, supra note 132, at 49-50.
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Although secured lending creates monitoring efficiencies for certain
creditors, it does not benefit those creditors who have not bargained for
priority. Dean Robert Scott, however, carries the monitoring cost argument
even further, focusing on the relationship between a debtor and its lead
lender.3 5 He seeks to show that the monitoring efforts of the secured
creditor may also benefit the debtor's unsecured creditors. He points out
that a floating lien creditor expects to be repaid out of the proceeds of the
business, rather than out of the collateral per se, and that its monitoring
efforts will look at the same things as would an unsecured creditor. In so
doing, the debtor saves money because the unsecured creditors are freed
from their monitoring burden. This efficiency benefit does not come at the
expense of the unsecured creditors."'
In comparison to the variety of monitoring cost arguments, James
White offers an answer of a slightly different type: secured credit is
necessary because it compensates for lender risk aversion." 7 Commercial
lenders, he argues, are by nature risk averse. If this is the case, then secured
credit is necessary to create the efficient amount of lending. 3" Kanda and
Levmore have made a related argument that secured credit operates to
control risk alteration, by balancing the interests of early and late lenders.' 39
If an early lender takes collateral, the security prevents the debtor from
altering the riskiness of the loan by borrowing more money. By contrast,
late money priorities, such as the purchase money security interest, give
135. Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901, 904
(1986). According to Scott,
[t]he leverage obtained by holding the debtor's assets hostage empowers the

secured creditor to influence the debtor's business decisions, thus ensuring that new
projects are properly developed. Most significantly, this relationship induces the

creditor to provide valuable financial coordination and control, with resulting
benefits accruing to all participants in the venture.
Id.

136. Id. at 933 ("The global monitoring required of the relational creditor releases other
creditors from the focused monitoring tasks that they would undertake in the absence of the
relational creditor. The resulting cost savings thus provides additional economies that are
unlikely to be achieved where such security arrangements are not permitted.").
137. James J. White, Efficiency Justificationsfor PersonalProperty Security, 37 Vand. L Rev.
473,491-93 (1984).

138. Id. at 502-06. Schwartz argues that this argument is implausible because risk averse
financiers will lose out in the Darwinian struggle for survival to financiers who are not risk
averse. See Schwartz, ContinuingPuzzle, supra note 122, at 1062-63 ("Corporate managers who
maximize share values will not act as if they are risk averse, for risk aversion follows from the
diminishing marginal utility of money theory. This theory does not describe the behavior of a
person who seeks to maximize share values."). White also argues that trade creditors look to
cash flow and do not actually expect to be repaid out of the debtor's assets. As such, unsecured
creditors should be indifferent to the existence of secured credit. White, supra note 137, at
476. This argument seems implausible. Increasing the indebtedness of a debtor increases the
risk that it will fail. As such, a trade creditor who cannot adjust its credit terms will not be
indifferent to the capital structure of the debtor.
139. Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 Va. L. Rev. 2103,
2105-06 (1984).
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priority to lenders who may be in a better position to determine the
profitability of certain investments, and whose loans are not likely to harm
the position of earlier creditors.
Finally, Professor Ronald Mann has done some extremely important
work. 4 ' He has taken the radical step of asking secured creditors
themselves to "explain" the reasons they engage in secured and unsecured
lending. He notes that the creditors themselves do not explain their desire
for security in terms of the "risk shifting" effect of secured credit, but
instead focus on the enhanced leverage it gives the creditor to enforce
payment. Even this hostage value explanation, however, turns on, and
results in, risk alteration. Absent some undemonstrated positive externality,
any measure that increases the likelihood that one creditor will be repaid,
either inside or outside of bankruptcy, increases the riskiness of the
investments of other creditors. Indeed, it is not surprising that the creditors
interviewed focused on the benefit to themselves from secured credit rather
than the harm that it does to others.
Although these theories are helpful, none is completely satisfactory as
an explanation for the prevalence of secured credit and the persistent
demand of debtors' and creditors for asset-based financing. Even if the
inadequacy of these explanations is not particularly troubling, their
weakness suggests that academics have not found the true answer to the
puzzle. Perhaps the most convincing of these explanations is Mann's
leverage explanation. Yet while this may explain the reason why creditors
think that they lend on a secured basis, this leverage is not an unalloyed
benefit. One creditor's leverage increases the risk faced by other creditors.
b. Explaining Secured Credit: The Inefficiency Concerns
In this regard, Mann's "solution" to the puzzle provides a link to
another set of explanations for secured credit. These lie on the cost side of
the equation-in the failure of the notice system to eliminate certain
externalities of secured credit. Concern about the externalities of secured
credit was first articulated by Professor Paul Shupack.

140. Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 Harv. L Rev. 625, 626
(1997) [hereinafter Mann, Pattern]; Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business
Lending, 86 Geo. LJ. 1, 41 (1997); Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of
Secured Debt, 96 Mich. L Rev. 159, 233-36 (1997).
141. See Schwartz, Continuing Puzzle, supra note 122, at 1068 ("The secured debt puzzle

remains: firms issue much debt on a secured basis, yet the causes and effects of this practice
are largely unknown."); Schwartz, Theoy, supra note 122, at 247 ("[T]he question of why some
debtors offer security in lieu of or in addition to loan covenants remains puzzling."). Ronald
Mann has suggested that the pattern of secured credit can be explained based on the
creditor's attempt to balance the increased security of a collateralized loan against the
increased costs of obtaining security. RonaldJ. Mann, Pattern,supra note 140, at 671-74.
142. See Shupack, supra note 133.
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(1) Nonadjusting Consensual Creditors

First, Shupack noted, many creditors cannot adjust their interest rate
when the riskiness of the investment changes.' 43 For example, an unsecured
lender who lends before the debtor gives collateral for a second loan may
not be able to adjust the interest rate of its loan prior to maturity. Similarly,
employees often lack the bargaining power to alter the credit terms that
they give to the company with regard to accrued but unpaid wages, vacation
pay, sick leave or other benefits. Suppliers who enter into individual
transactions may not find it cost-effective to customize the credit terms of
each transaction and may simply choose to do business on an open
account. 144
Thus, once one relaxes the assumption, implicit in Modigliani and
Miller, that all creditors can adjust their interest rates in a cost-free and
relatively instantaneous fashion, secured credit will have some costs. Some
creditors may recognize their inability to adjust and may in fact charge a
higher interest rate, or higher price, at the outset. 45 Others may insist on a
negative covenant prohibiting future secured lending. Some creditors may
not, however, be in a position to do either. Employees are the obvious
example here.
(2) Nonconsensual Creditors and Inefficiency
When nonconsensual creditors are involved, the existence of a subsidy
is more plain. Article 9's solution to the problem of "safety" was one
premised on voluntary investment. The Article 9 filing system would protect
widows and orphans through a simple disclosure mechanism that would
allow potential investors to determine .whether the assets of the debtor are
encumbered. Tort claimants, by contrast, do not make a voluntary
investment decision based on credit risk. They do not, therefore, benefit
from the system of notice filing.' Indeed, when a company engages in a
risky activity, it may nonetheless be able to raise capital on a secured basis
and place the risk of insolvency on nonconsensual tort claimants. The
shareholders receive all profits realized as a result of the gamble, while the
143. Id. at 1094.
144. This inability to adjust may not harm suppliers and other sophisticated unsecured
lenders who have the ability to spread risk. While many sellers extend 30 days credit as part of
a sales transaction without charging additional interest, they may roll interest and the risk of

business failure into the price they charge. For the most part, however, these merchants do
not adjust the price that they charge based on the creditworthiness of a particular debtor.
Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 18, at 896-99. Leveraged firms may thus have the ability to raise
the costs of their unleveraged competitors.
145. Id. at 887-91.
146. In this description of tort claimants, it may be necessary to distinguish the productsliability claimant from the claimant who is run over by the debtor's delivery truck. The

products-liability claimant has entered into a consensual relation with the debtor, and, as such
is (at least in theory) in a position to make a decision based on credit risk. The same cannot be
said of the accident victim.
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tort claimants bear the costs. Under this understanding of secured credit,
the availability of secured credit, coupled with limited liability, may severely
undercut the effectiveness of the system of tort liability. Entities that face
substantial tort liability may, in effect, render themselves judgment-proof
through the use of secured credit.'47 No empirical study has measured the
size of this subsidy, and it is likely to vary significantly with the nature of the
business involved. 48 Nonetheless, when an entity can predict that it will
have a large number of nonconsensual creditors relative to assets, the
subsidy will be greater,
and the entity could be expected to borrow heavily
19
on a secured basis. 4
Having identified the subsidy of secured credit, it is now clearer why
secured credit exists. An important question remains, however: do the costs
of secured credit outweigh its benefits? This empirical question arises
because the existence of a negative externality does not necessarily compel

the conclusion that security interests are undesirable. When a corporation
147.

This ability is not absolute. Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, courts may

invalidate as fraudulent conveyances security interests where the debtor received little or no
consideration in return for conveyance of the lien and the debtor was insolvent or rendered
insolvent by the transaction. See, e.g., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d
1288, 1296-1301 (3d Cir. 1986) (affirming district court's finding of fraudulent conveyance
and invalidating security interest where issuer of junk bonds was aware that the transaction
would render the leveraged corporation insolvent); In re Greenbrook Carpet Co., Inc., 722
F.2d 659, 660 (lth Cir. 1984) (refusing to find fraudulent conveyance where debtor
corporation transferred proceeds of a secured loan to principal owners in exchange for
security interest in financial securities because debtor received "reasonably equivalent value"
for the loan). But see Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 850 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to find
fraudulent conveyance in case involving leveraged buyout where no evidence was presented of
intent to defraud creditors and selling shareholders were unaware of leveraged buyout). But
fraudulent conveyance law will only capture a relatively small number of these 'judgment
proofing" security interests. A court will only find the secured transaction fraudulent if the
creditor did not receive "reasonably equivalent value," and such value may include
cancellation of a preexisting debt. LoPucki, Death, supra note 30, at 10 n.26. Moreover,
secured credit is not the only mechanism that a debtor may use in order to render itself
judgment proof. See generally LoPucki, Death, supra note 30. Debtors may also use ownership
strategies, id. at 19, asset securitization, id. at 23, bankruptcy exemptions, id. at 30, and foreign
debt havens, id. at 32, to accomplish the same objective.
148. Theory and reality may collide here because of the inefficiency of the tort system.
While Posner and other law and economics scholars have praised the efficiency of common law
tort rules, Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 58, at 163-216, many others believe that the
tort system has run amok. See Note, "Common Sense" Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort
Reform, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1765 (1996) (noting a strong popular consensus over tort
reform).
149. According to Harris and Mooney, "[w]hether the benefits of secured credit outweigh
its costs in a few, many, or most of the circumstances in which security interests are granted is
an empirical question that cannot be answered with any certainty using existing information."
Harris & Mooney, supra note 3, at 2036. Moreover, because systematic empirical work remains
to be done, scholars can still argue that the costs of secured credit are trivial when compared
to the benefits or at least that the data is inconclusive. Harris and Mooney raise an important
question about LoPucki's use of bankruptcy data to draw conclusions about the efficiency of
Article 9. They point out that looking only at bankruptcy data may obscure the efficiency
benefits of the vast majority of secured obligations that are repaid. Id. at 2028-37.
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engages in an activity that is socially desirable and the corporation is
solvent, the subsidy created by secured credit and limited liability may be
the incentive necessary to encourage investors to invest their funds in the
enterprise. Furthermore, when the entity is solvent, the effect of secured
credit and limited liability on shareholders' incentives to take reasonable
care is likely to be minimal or at least tolerable.
To illustrate this point, imagine that General Amusements' business,
discussed above, has grown. Its assets are now valued at one million dollars.
It has secured debt of $250,000, unsecured debt of $250,000, and
shareholder equity totaling $500,000. Imagine further that Whoopie
Cushions® have a useful life of one year, and in any given year there is a
one in five probability that a Whoopie Cushion® manufactured that year
will explode and injure a Whoopie Cushion® user. On average, the tort
liability for each Whoopie Cushion® explosion is $100,000. On the
corporate balance sheet, this should be treated as a $100,000 liability
payable over five years. This would reduce shareholder's equity by $100,000
discounted over five years (say, $80,000).150
If a change in the design of Whoopie Cushions® could eliminate this
risk for a cost of $50,000, then the change is socially desirable. Under this
example, the shareholders would choose to make the change because
making it would increase the value of their investment in the company. A
charge against equity of $80,000 could be eliminated for a price of $50,000.
Because the debtor makes the same decision with or without secured credit,
the effect of secured credit is ambiguous.
(3) Leverage and Moral Hazard
By contrast, if the company is insolvent or close to insolvency, the
effect on incentives is greater. Shareholders, officers, and managers have a
significant incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior. Imagine that
General Amusements' assets are still worth $1,000,000, but now secured
claims against the company total $600,000, and unsecured claims total
$360,000. The probability of an accident remains the same. Therefore, the
shareholders' equity, taking the $80,000 charge into account, is now worth
negative $40,000. If the corporation can eliminate $80,000 of the risk at a
cost of $50,000, it is socially desirable. However, on these facts, the
shareholders remain underwater even if the investment is made. As a result,
the only hope for the shareholders to receive a return on their investment is
to gamble that during the next several years no Whoopie Cushions® will
explode, and that this will allow the company to return to profitability. The
shareholders will bear none of the cost, but will receive a portion of the
benefit if the gamble pays off. The secured creditors bear none of the risk
either. Even under the worst-case scenario they will probably be paid in full
out of the proceeds of the sale of their collateral. The costs are borne
150. At an interest rate of five percent, compounded annually, an $80,000 investment in
year one would be worth $102,102.52 at the end of five years.
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instead by the unsecured creditors (including employees and tort claimants)
who will share pro rata in the value of the company's unencumbered assets.
This moral hazard is in part a product of limited liability (the
shareholders cannot lose more than their investment), and in part a product
of the existence of secured credit (the secured creditors will be paid
regardless of the riskiness of the debtor's behavior). However, the almost
inevitable conclusion is that, other things being equal, the priority of
secured credit over claims of involuntary creditors will lead to more secured
lending than is efficient or desirable.
Notwithstanding the absence of systematic empirical work, history has
borne out some of Shupack's concerns. Indeed, Article 9 may be a victim of
its own success. Gilmore and Dunham created a mechanism through which
it was possible and relatively inexpensive for a secured creditor to take a
security interest in virtually all of a debtor's assets. Because it was possible, it
was done. During the 1980s, Wall Street developed and refined the
leveraged buyout, a technique through which an investor could purchase a
company by putting up a limited amount of money, borrow the rest, and
offer her financiers security in the form of the assets of the target company.
These transactions took corporations with substantial unencumbered assets
and replaced them with highly leveraged and much riskier companies.
When a significant number of these leveraged companies failed or
reorganized during the early 1990s, the effect of these leveraged corporate
capital structures on unsecured creditors became painfully obvious.'
Indeed, even in the absence of a leveraged buyout, lifetime employees
found themselves unsecured claimants against underfunded pension plans,
and tort claimants found themselves in possession of almost worthless
52
claims.1
151.

The bankruptcies of Federated Department Stores and Southland fall into this

category. See Suzanne Bilello, Year Makes Huge Differencefor Federated, Newsday, Mar. 9, 1993,

at 35 ("When Federated sought protection from creditors in January, 1990, it was sinking
under the weight of debt from the biggest leveraged buyout in retail history."); Southland in
Exit From Bankruptcy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1991, at D4 (explaining that Southland
Corporation's bankruptcy followed the founding Thompson family's efforts to take the
company private through a leveraged buyout).
152. For a graphic example of the effect of bankruptcy on retirees, see LTIV Steel Co. v.
United Mine Workers of Am. (In re Chateugay Corp.), 945 F.2d 1205, 1210 (2d Cir. 1991),
and for examples of the treatment of tort claims, see A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d
994 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that Chapter 11 debtor was entitled to preliminary injunction
staying plaintiffs' suits). See also In re Johns Manville Corp., No. 82B1 1656-11676 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982); Lee Ann Flyer, Comment, Will Financially Sound CorporateDebtors Succeed in
Using Chapter 11 of the Bankrupty Act as a Shield Against Massive Tort Liability?, 56 Temp. LQ.

539, 542-43 (1983) (discussing the ramifications to tort claimants if two asbestos corporations
succeed in shielding themselves from tort liability by filing for Chapter 11 protection);
Christopher M.E. Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priorityin the Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times,

The Worst of Times, 36 Stan. L Rev. 1045, 1046 (1984) ("[Under either liquidation or
reorganization rules] tort claimants go uncompensated because of their low priority in a
bargaining system despite the fact that they are inherently unable to bargain."). Although the
LTV, Robins and Manville bankruptcies were not leverage driven, highly leveraged capital
structures increase the risk of business failure and reduce the likelihood that retirees and tort
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Article 9, at least in part, made possible the creation of a new type of
corporate entity: the judgment-proof, yet asset-laden, corporate shell. Thus
history lends plausibility to the externality-based story of secured credit.
(4) The Subsidy of Secured Credit
The desirability or undesirability of secured credit cannot be
completely assessed in the absence of empirical work that has yet to be
done. In Professor LoPucki's view, however, even without such empirical
work, it is possible to demonstrate that secured credit is less efficient than it
could be: "That subsidy may or may not account for the prevalence of
security. But, as with anything subsidized, there will tend to be more of it
than is economically efficient."'" 3 The subsidy for secured credit, he argues,
will encourage debtors who are sliding into insolvency to encumber their
assets up to and (if they can) beyond the liquidation value."&Having made
this logical connection between the subsidy of secured credit and the
tendency of a financially troubled debtor to encumber all or substantially all
of its assets, LoPucki looks to recent bankruptcy statistics to show that only a
very small fraction of bankruptcy filings result in any distribution to
unsecured creditors. 55 For LoPucki, these statistics provide all the empirical
support necessary for a call to reform the Article 9 priority scheme.
Having demonstrated that the reasons for the popularity of secured
credit may lie in the subsidy obtained by secured creditors and debtors at
the expense of nonadjusting and involuntary creditors, Professors Lucian
Bebchuck and Jesse Fried carry the argument one step further and identify
the specific types of inefficiency costs associated with full priority for
secured credit. Like LoPucki, Bebchuck and Fried argue that full priority
will cause the excessive use of security interests.1 G In addition, they argue
that full priority will distort the investment and precaution decisions of the
debtor, 57 and will lead to suboptimal use of covenants, 58 to suboptimal
claimants will be paid.
153. LoPucki, Bargain, supra note 18, at 1920-21. As LoPucki has noted elsewhere:
[The UCO drafters] largely succeeded in their effort [to simplify secured credit].
The effect was to increase dramatically the proportion of encumbered assets in the
American economy. The change appeared first in bankruptcy liquidations. Early
bankruptcy liquidations produced at least some distributions to creditors in the
majority of cases. By 1976, the percentage of bankruptcy liquidations in which there
was a distribution to unsecured creditors had fallen to twenty percent; by 1991-92 it
had sunk to five percent. In 1926-27, unsecured creditors recovered over twentyseven cents on the dollar in assignment liquidations .... By 1976, the average

recovery in all bankruptcy cases had fallen to less than one cent on the dollar.
Lopucki, Death, supra note 30, at 18-19.
154. See Lopucki, Bargain, supra note 18, at 1931-38 ("As every bankruptcy practitioner
knows, security tends to expand to the liquidation value of the collateral as a debtor sinks into
financial distress.").
155. Id. at 1935.
156. Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 18, at 896-98.
157. Id. at 898-900.
158. Id. at 900-02.
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creditor monitoring, and to suboptimal enforcement of covenants.' 59
Most commentators have already recognized that, at some level,
secured credit in its present form creates perverse incentives to engage in
unreasonably risky behavior.' 0 Although nobody argues that secured credit
should be abolished, there are compelling arguments that altering the
159. Id. at 902-04. When speaking of nonconsensual creditors, it is necessary to keep in
mind two competing definitions of efficiency: (1) Kaldor-Hicks efficiency; and (2) Pareto
optimality. Under the Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency, a rule is efficient if the gains to
the beneficiaries outweigh the losses to the losers. Actual compensation is not necessary-it is
sufficient that what the winners win exceeds what the losers lose. Jules L. Coleman, Markets,
Morals and Law 84 (1988). A rule meets the requirement of Pareto optimality only if any
additional reallocation of resources will provide gains to one person only at the expense of
another, Id. at 71-72. Thus, to meet the condition of Pareto optimality, anybody harmed by a
rule must actually be compensated by the individuals benefitting from the rule. The efficiency
scholars use the Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency when they evaluate the efficiency of
secured credit. Compare Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing,82 Cornell L Rev.
1436, 1441-42 (1997) (focusing on Kaldor-Hicks efficiency) with Kenneth N. Klee, Barbarians
at the Trough: Riposte in Defense of the Warren Carve-Out Proposal,82 Cornell L. Rev. 1466, 1471
(1997) ("Of course, it is possible that the benefits to the debtor, its employees, and society at
large that will derive from the extension of secured credit outweigh the detriments to
unsecured creditors. That is, the marginal extension of secured credit may be Kaldor-Hicks
efficient, even if it is not Pareto superior. But that is precisely the focus of the [Warren]
Proposal, which endeavors to compensate unsecured creditors for exposure to increased
risks.")
On some level, LoPucki's and Bebchuck and Fried's arguments prove too much. If
they are right, then one would expect that debtors would encumber as many of their assets as
they could in order to obtain an interest rate savings at the expense of non-adjusting and nonconsensual creditors. A number of scholars have recently recognized that there are costs
associated with issuing secured credit that may balance the prospect of an interest rate savings.
These costs include (1) additional costs of closing the transaction (such as filing); (2)
additional costs of administering the loan (such as monitoring the collateral); (3) reputational
costs associated with borrowing on a secured basis. See Mann, Pattern, supra note 140, at 65867 (arguing that a borrower will not borrow on a secured basis unless the value of the security
in terms of increased likelihood of repayment exceeds these costs); Steven L. Schwarcz, The
Relatively Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: A Response to Professors
Bebchuck and Fried, 47 Duke LJ. 425, 447 (1997) [hereinafter, Schwarcz, Easy Case). As
Professor Schwarcz noted:
Simply stated, a debtor incurs costs when it encumbers its assets .... The existence
of [a measure of these costs] explains why debtors-other than those that can only
obtain credit on a secured basis-typically obtain financing on an unsecured basis
even though the interest rate may be higher than for secured credit.
Id,
160. Indeed, Professors Douglas Baird, Hideki Kanda and Saul Levmore, and Robert Scott
have all acknowledged in recent articles that secured credit creates such incentives. See Baird,
supra note 17, at 2251 (concluding that "[A]rticle 9 may not give proper weight to the costs
that some secured transactions impose"); Kanda & Levmore, supra note 139, at 2103 (stating
that additional obligations may induce a debtor to engage in riskier behavior that may
generate inefficiencies and harm creditors who did not plan on this level of risk); Scott, supra
note 38, at 1783 (arguing that one form of "debtor misbehavior" is "asset substitution," which
occurs when a debtor proceeds to a riskier project after being issued secured debt for a
venture with less risk). Schwarcz too agrees that while new money secured loans may reduce
the risk of insolvency, transfers of collateral that secure existing debts are more likely to cause
harm to existing creditors. Schwarcz, Easy Case, supra note 159, at 433-36.

ARTICLE 9
Article 9 priority scheme would make secured credit more efficient.
c.Proposed Solutions and the Revisers' Response
Towards that end, Professor LoPucki has argued that the appropriate
response is to eliminate at least part of the subsidy for secured credit by
creating a priority for tort claimants superior to that of the secured creditor.
A priority for tort claimants would force secured creditors, who, after all, are
consensual creditors, to consider the true riskiness of the debtor's enterprise
and to adjust the interest rate to reflect the fact that they might be forced to
bear the burden of the debtor's torts. 6' This in turn would cause the debtor
to internalize the true riskiness of its behavior.
Bebchuck and Fried's suggestions go farther than LoPucki's. Bebchuck
and Fried have suggested limiting the priority of secured claims, turning
secured claimants into partially unsecured claimants, and thereby giving
them an incentive to monitor the activities of the debtor. They argue for a
form of equity cushion: either (1) the secured creditor's priority should be
limited to eighty percent of the value of the collateral, or (2) the secured
creditor's claim should be subordinated to the claims of both involuntary
to amend section
and nonadjusting creditors. Professor Warren's proposal
62
9-301 embodies Bebchuck and Fried's first proposal.
By contrast, the Revisers appear to object to any proposals for change
to the priority scheme based on concern about externalities.' 63 As Professor
Warren has noted, at its December 1995 meeting, "The Article 9 drafting
committee was unwilling to draft a proposal that insured that some assets
would remain for unsecured creditors in the event of the debtor's failure...
,,64 The Revisers argue in response that the costs of fixing any problem

161. There is a compelling logic to LoPucki's suggestion. As discussed above, the drafters
of Article 9 recognized that a secret lien was fraudulent as to creditors and would not be
enforced against third parties. They solved this problem by creating a system of notice, which
allowed consensual creditors an opportunity to loan, not to loan, or to seek more information.
The notice solution does not justify giving secured creditors priority over nonconsensual
creditors. Nonconsensual creditors are not harmed because they were deceived. They are
harmed because they are injured by an entity that is unable to compensate them for the harm
caused. Thus, the policy question with regard to tort claimants is fundamentally different in
type. It is not a question of notice, but a question of what constitutes an unreasonably risky
capital structure. Once the problem of nonconsensual creditors is viewed this way, the terms of
the discussion shift. Rather than speaking in terms of freedom of contract, the terms of the
discussion turn to questions of who is the least cost avoider of the harm. Is the tort victim in a
better position to avoid the costs of being injured by an insolvent, or is the tortfeasor's secured
lender in a better position to monitor its debtor? The answer seems relatively clear. The
lender who enters into a consensual relationship is in a far better position to encourage
prudence than the unidentified tort victim.
162. Warren, Proposal,supra note 18.
163. Woodward, supra note 26.
164. Warren, Proposal,supra note 18, at 1. Indeed, Professor Warren notes that the Warren
proposal "followed extensive debate over the efforts of the current Article 9 drafting
committee to extend the reach of security interests to lock up all the property of a debtor." Id.
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that might exist will likely exceed the costs of the problem itself.' 5 Even
once Professor Warren took it upon herself to draft a proposal, it received
no support and virtually no discussion in the Drafting Committee.'o
B. ProposalsAimed at ProtectingConsumers
In addition to proposals aimed at risk alteration, a number of
proposals were made by consumer advocate Gail Hillebrand to protect
consumers from some of the harsher effects of secured credit. These
proposals were aimed principally at Article 9's remedy provisions.
Hillebrand's concern was not based on risk alteration, per se, but instead on
the view that secured consumer credit transactions are largely the result of
contracts of adhesion. An automobile purchaser rarely negotiates the terms
under which her car may be repossessed when she takes out a loan secured
by the car. Even more problematic, many store credit cards create purchase
money security interests with language on the back of the charge slip. In
these instances, the consumer may not even be aware that a security
interest has been'created and perfected.
Unlike the Warren Proposal, the efforts of Gail Hillebrand" 7 initially
met with some success.' 6 8 A Consumer Task Force was formed, and a
number of proposals suggested by Hillebrand were included in the draft."6 9
165. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 3, at 2023-24 ("Although the efficiency literature
may be interesting and useful, we conclude that it is largely free of cogent support for
materially modifying the current legal regime for secured transactions.").
166. Woodward, supra note 26, at 1512.
167. The stated goals of the consumer representative were relatively modest-to prevent
the Revisors from eroding protections available under current law. Memorandum from Gail
Hillebrand to ALI Council 3 (Nov. 14, 1996) [hereinafter Hillebrand Memorandum] (on file
with Iowa Lau, Review). As Hillebrand noted:

The new Article 9 draft ... moves quite far toward facilitating secured credit ....
Those very changes in the ... draft make the inclusion of separate consumer rules
essential to preserve some elements of current law for consumers, and to rebalance
the statute for consumers in light of the many changes being made to it.
Id. For example, the consumer representatives objected to: (1) creation of a bona fide error
defense to statutory damages where a creditor violates Article 9; (2) broadening the definition
of purchase money to include a refinance of a purchase money security interest; (3)
broadening the scope of a purchase money security interest to include "mixed" collateral; and
(4) elimination of the doctrine of constructive strict foreclosure. Id. at 4-7. They also sought to
have "price" included as a term that must be "commercially reasonable," when price is used to
calculate a deficiency. Id. at 9.
168.

See Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will Articles 2, 2B

and 9 Be Fair to Consumers?, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 69 (1997) (describing two problems the 1996
draft did address in some fashion); Hillebrand Memorandum, supra note 167.
169. The Reporters' Prefatory Comment to the Proposed Final Draft states with regard to
consumer transactions:
Background. In 1995, NCCUSL appointed a subcommittee of the Drafting
Conmittee to consider whether and to what extent Article 9 draft should contain
consumer-protection provisions. The subcommittee made several recommendations
that the Drafting Committee considered during its meetings in 1996 and 1997.
Many of the provisions that the Drafting Committee adopted, and which the ALI
membership discussed at its 1997 annual meeting, remained highly controversial.
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However, in response to these efforts to include consumer-protective
language in the remedial provisions of Article 9, representatives of the
automobile financing and consumer credit industry withdrew angrily from
discussions, arguing that consumer interests had captured the process. 70
Only after heroic efforts to mediate the dispute led by Marion Benfield and
assisted by Neil Cohen, Gerald Bepko, and others, was the dispute resolved
at the very last scheduled meeting of the Article 9 Drafting Committee.'
This peace treaty was viewed by representatives of both the consumer
groups and the consumer credit industry as largely a return to former law.
The compromise eliminates certain changes that would have been harmful
to consumers, but does 17not
expand protection of consumers beyond that
2
afforded by current law.

The draft that emerged proved unsatisfactory to many representatives of both
consumers and consumer creditors.
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 12, at xxx.
170. Id.; Hillebrand Memorandum, supra note 167, at 3. At the time of the "walk-out" the
draft of Revised Article 9 contained the following provisions that could be viewed as favorable
to consumers: (1) exclusion of consumer deposit accounts from Article 9 for consumer
transactions; (2) limited rights of reinstatement that arose after 60% of the principal has been
repaid and could be used once during the life of the loan; (3) reciprocal rights to attorney's
fees; (4) a restriction on the power of consumers to waive certain rights provided by Article 9;
and (5) exclusion of consumer transactions from the ten-day safe harbor for a notice of
disposition, from a special bare bones safe harbor notice of disposition, and from the addition
of partial strict foreclosure. Id. at 10.
171. The Reporters' Prefatory Comment to the Proposed Final Draft states:
Proposed compromise solution. In 1997, the Chair of the Drafting Committee initiated
a renewed effort to reach a consensus solution that would not be actively opposed
by consumer or consumer-creditor interests. After many rounds of discussions and
much "shuttle diplomacy," a tentative solution was reached during the February,
1998, meeting of the Drafting Committee. During that meeting, the Drafting
Committee approved in principle, and asked the Reporters to incorporate in the
next draft, a list of proposed revisions relating to consumer transactions. Most of
the proposals, but not all, related to Part 6, Default. The Chair of the Drafting
Committee presented the proposals as a compromise, explaining that if the package of
proposals were accepted by the Drafting Committee and its sponsors, representatives of
consumer creditors involved in the process would actively support, and advocates of consumer
interests involved in the process would not oppose, enactment of revised Article 9. The Chair
explainedfurther that the alternativecould be widespread opposition, uith pitched battles in
the various legislaturesduring the enactment process. This controversy could delay or inhibit
enactment of the revisions.

Proposed Final Draft, supra note 12, at xxxi (emphasis added).
172. The Reporters' Prefatory Comment to the Proposed Final Draft describes the
discussions, and is set forth at length, as follows:
Deleted provisions. Under the proposal, several consumer-protection provisions in
the January, 1998, draft, which had been approved by the Drafting Committee,
would be deleted:
(i) Section 9-104(d) and (e) (allocation of payments for determining
purchase-money status in consumer-goods transactions);
(ii) Section 9-613(b)(3) (notice of disposition containing minor errors
not seriously misleading is sufficient);
(iii) Section 9-622 (reinstatement rights of consumer debtor or
secondary obligor);
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(iv) Section 9-624(d) and (e) (reduction of secured party's liability for
statutory damages by amount of loss of deficiency or actual damages
awarded to consumer);
(v) Section 9-625, Alternative A (absolute bar of deficiency
alternative for secured party noncompliance in consumer transactions);
(vi) Section 9-627(d) (good-faith error defense to statutory damages);
(viii) Section 9-627(e) (limitation on recoveries in class actions); and
(vii) Section 9-628 (reciprocal attorney's fees in consumer
transactions).
Revised provisions. The proposal also called for revision of several other provisions.
(i) In addition to deleting Alternative A of Section 9-625 (absolute
bar rule), the rebuttable presumption rule in Section 9-624 would be
made applicable only to transactions other than consumer transactions.
The draft would renmin silent as to the effect of a secured party's
noncompliance in consumer transactions, leaving that issue to the courts.
(During its March, 1998, meeting the Drafting Committee decided that
the draft should contain a statutory statement that no implications for
consumer transactions should be drawn from the statutory rebuttable
presumption rule for non-consumer transactions. See Section 9-625(b) of
this draft.)
(ii) Sections 9-104(f) and (g) (approving "dual status" rule for
purchase-money security interests (i.e., rejecting "transformation" rule)
and setting burden of proof) would be applicable only to non-consumergoods transactions. (During its March, 1998, meeting the Drafting
Committee decided that the draft should contain a statutory statement
that no implications for consumer-goods transactions should be drawn
from the statutory treatment of non-consumer-goods transactions. See
Section 9-104(i) of this draft.)
(iii) Either the definition of "buyer in ordinary course of business"
would not be revised to provide that BIOCOB status depends on a
possessory right as against the seller, or certain proposed provisions in
revised Article- 2 would accompany revised Article 9 to provide protection
for a prepaying buyer. (During its March, 1998, meeting the Drafting
Committee adopted the latter approach, reflected in this draft. See
Appendix I.)
(iv) The comment to Section 9-111 would contain no examples of
sufficient collateral descriptions in consumer transactions (e.g., the
previous approval of "alljewelry" in the Reporters' Conments would be
deleted).
(v) Sections 9-403 and 9-404 would be expanded to make effective
the FTC's anti-holder-in-due-course rule (when applicable) even in the
absence of the required legend.
(vi) Section 9-614A (post-disposition notice) would be revised to
provide for a somewhat more refined statement of how a deficiency or
surplus was calculated.
(vii) The comments would be modified to delete any explicit
statement that "price" is not a term of a disposition which is required to
be commercially reasonable, and an explanatory comment would be
added to the effect that a low price mandates enhanced judicial scrutiny
of the terms of a disposition.
(viii) Section 9-618 would be revised to prohibit partial strict
foreclosure for consumer goods.
Drafting Committee resolution. During its March, 1998, meeting, the Drafting
Committee considered the Reporters' efforts, incorporated in the March, 1998,
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C. ProposalsAimed at Simplicity

1. The Article 9 Revision and Proposals That Respond to Technological
Change
By contrast to the fate of the Warren Proposal and the proposals of
consumer advocates, the Revisers have welcomed amendments that seek to
take modem technology into account. A wide variety of proposals have been
made, and many have been included in the current draft. For example,
current section 9-402 has been amended in order to make the filing system
"media neutral," and to eliminate the signature requirement.'73 These
changes have been made to facilitate electronic filing. The Revision also
amends section 9-103 so that the choice of law governing perfection for
virtually all collateral would be the law of the jurisdiction where the debtor
is located.'74 If the debtor is a corporation, the location of the debtor is the
state of incorporation."7 5 Under current section 9-103, the law of the
jurisdiction "where the collateral is located" governs perfection and the
effects of perfection and nonperfection for ordinary goods. This rule made
sense where most lending was local, and the lender and the collateral were
likely to be located in the same jurisdiction, even when the debtor did
business on a national basis. These conditions are not as likely to hold
today. More important, today, because of computer technology, it is feasible
and inexpensive for a prospective California creditor to search the UCC
draft, to implement the proposed solution. The Drafting Committee gave its
general approval to the proposed solution. It also considered a number of specific
issues that had been raised by the consumer and consumer creditor representatives.
The Drafting Committee resolved all remaining material issues. This draft reflects
that resolution. However, we should note three caveats. First, inasmuch as less than
two weeks were available for us to revise the draft following the March, 1998,
meeting, this draft has not been reviewed by anyone other than the Reporters.
Second, several elements of the proposed solution for the consumer-related issues
implicate the language of the Official Comments that will accompany the final
revised text of Article 9. While substantial progress has been made in formulating
these comments, they have not yet been finalized. Finally, the proposed solution of
the consumer-related issues has been recognized by all concerned as a compromise.
The statutory text that has emerged is less than ideal in substance and approach. It
represents a balance struck in the hope that it will enhance the opportunities for
prompt and uniform enactment of revised Article 9.
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 12, at xxxi-xxxiii.
173. These changes are reflected in sections 9-502 (contents of financing statement), 9-503
(name of debtor and secured party), 9-506 (effect of minor errors and omissions), 9-504
(indication of collateral), and 9-508 (persons entitled to file) of the Proposed Final Draft, supra
note 12.
174. These changes are reflected in sections 9-301 (choice-of-law provision), 9-307
(location of debtor) and 9-314(a) (continued perfection following change of law) of the
Proposed Final Draft. Under proposed section 9-301(3), the effect of perfection or
nonperfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located. Id. § 9301(3).
175. Id. § 9-307.
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records in Delaware to determine whether an Arkansas creditor has
perfected a security interest in collateral located in Florida. Indeed, UCC
filings can now be searched electronically from virtually anywhere in the
country.
Amendments to current sections 9-302"6 and 9-304177 increase the
importance of the filing system by allowing perfection of a security interest
in instruments by filing, 17 ' and by clarifying the rules for taking "control" of
instruments. 179 These changes are also driven by modem technology. The
ability to perfect a security interest in instruments by filing would appear to
reflect the fact that much commercial paper is handled through
clearinghouses and that the "holder" never takes delivery of the instrument
itself. 8 ' On the whole, these changes appear to be for the good. They allow
Article 9 to react to and grow with changes in technology and financial
practice.
2. Proposals That Enhance the Certainty of Secured Credit
In addition to proposals aimed at technological change, the Proposed
FinalDraft of Revised Article 9 contains a number of proposals that aim at
the goal of simplicity, but which, in the process, suggest fundamental
disregard for the inefficiency concerns discussed above. First, the Revisers
have expanded the scope of Article 9. The Article 9 Revision amends
current sections 9-102"8 and 9-1041 2 to bring security interests in deposit
accounts (in nonconsumer transactions),'8 3 payment intangibles (principally
loan participation agreements), and letters of credit within the scope of
Article 9.' The Proposed FinalDraft also expands the scope of Article 9 to
include healthcare insurance receivables,' 85 and (commercial) tort claims."
176.
177.

Id. § 9-108 (control over investment property); id. § 9-309(a) (when filing required).
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 12, §§ 9-310(a), 9-311(a), 9-327, & 9-328.

178. See id. § 9-310(a) (allowing perfection by filing of security interest in instruments,
chattel paper, investment property, or negotiable documents); id. § 9-311 (a) (allowing security
interest in goods, instruments, money, negotiable documents, or tangible chattel paper to be
perfected by taking possession of the collateral); id. § 9-327 (defining priority of purchaser of
chattel paper vis a vis holder of certain security interests); id. § 9-328 (describing priority of
holder of negotiable instrument over perfected security interest).
179.

Proposed Final Draft,supra note 12, § 9-311.

180. See Marcia Stigum, After the Trade: Dealer and Clearing Bank Operations in Money
Market and Government Securities 4-5 (1988); Marcia Stigum, The Money Market 484 (3d ed.
1990); RonaldJ. Mann, SearchingforNegotiabilityin Payment Law, 44 U.C.LA. L Rev. 951, 985

(1997) (stating that whatever role negotiability once might have taken in a commercial paper
market, an electronic transfer system has made documents obsolete).
181.
182.

Proposed Final Draft, supra note 12, § 9-112(a) (scope).
Id. § 9-112(d).

183.
184.
185.

Id. §9.112(d)(13).
Id. § 9-112(a).
Id. §9-112(d)(8)(A).

186.

Proposed Final Draft, supra note 12, § 9-112(d)(12) (providing that tort clams for

personal injury are still excluded from Article 9, but that other types of tort claims may be
used as collateral). The prior exclusion of these types of collateral from Article 9 did not mean
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In addition to expanding the scope of Article 9 to cover new types of
collateral, the Revision simplifies the process of perfecting a security
interest in these new types of collateral. The Revisers have amended section
9-402 to make it possible for a financing statement to recite that a creditor
has taken a security interest in "all" of the debtor's assets.' 87
One might surmise that the Revisers view changes to the priority
scheme as more troubling than these other types of changes. However, the
Revision also includes modifications to the priority scheme. Moreover, these
modifications, if anything, compound rather than ameliorate the externality
problem. One group of changes reflects the inclusion of deposit accounts
into the Article 9 scheme.'88 A second set of changes corrects uncertainties
in the law of purchase money security interests. 8 9 Each of these enhances
the certainty of a secured creditor's investment. Thus, the Drafting
Committee has proved willing to make changes that make secured credit
cheaper and its priority more certain. No changes were made to protect
involuntary or nonadjusting creditors, and consumers were, at best, able to
negotiate for a standstill.
III. EXPLAINING THE REVISERS' RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEMS OF PRIORITY
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

The preceding Part demonstrates that, even though original Article 9
and Revised Article 9 do an excellent job of simplifying and regularizing
the law of secured credit, neither Gilmore and Dunham nor Harris and
Mooney have been able to make it "safe.""1t The Proposed Final Draft does
nothing to address the third party effects of secured transactions, and does
nothing to soften the effect of secured transactions upon consumers. To the
that they could not be used to secure a loan. It simply meant that the law of perfection and
priority would turn on local nonuniform law. For deposit accounts, for example, perfection
and priority turned on the common law of pledge. Thus, incorporating these forms of
collateral into Article 9 reduces the uncertainty associated with these forms of collateral.
187. Id. §§ 9-502(a), 9-504. In the Proposed Final Draft, a financing statement may cover
"all" personal property, but a security agreement must specify the type of collateral. Id. §§ 9111 (sufficiency of description), 9-203 (enforceability of security interest).
188. See id. § 9-325 (defining priority of security interests in deposit accounts).
189. See id. § 9-322 (expanding on current sections 9-312(3) & 9-312(4)). In early drafts, a
second priority applied to production money security interests, secured by an interest in crops.
However,
[n]o consensus emerged on this issue within the Task Force, the Drafting
Committee, or the agricultural financing community. For this reason, the Drafting
Committee has included the production-money provisions in an Appendix. Under
this approach, the UCC sponsors would make no recommendation one way or the
other. In contrast to Section 9-321 of Discussion Draft No. 2, which presented the
production-money priority rule as proposed uniform statutory text, Appendix II
presents the rule as a "model."
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 12, at xxv (Reporters' Prefatory Comments).
190. This is not to say that secured credit is necessarily socially undesirable, or that it
should be abolished, but only to say that there is a problem that may need to be fixed and that
the problem cannot be fixed through the uniform law process.
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contrary, the Revision expands the scope of Article 9 to reduce the cost of
taking a security interest and tofacilitate the creation of security interests in
all of a debtor's assets.' 9'
In this Part, I use the decision rule developed in Part I to explain the
Revision's successes and its failures. First, I explore the possibility that
secured creditor interests have captured the drafting process. Second, I
explore the possibility that anticipated capture may have led the Revisers to
act like a captured legislature, and that anticipation of state competition
may have forced the drafters to facilitate a race to the bottom. I conclude
that concerns about the anticipated capture of state legislatures and an
anticipated race to the bottom contribute significantly to the failure of the
ProposedFinal Draft to address the distributive consequences of full priority.
Indeed, these concerns have also dictated the shape of the choice-of-law
provisions discussed above. Similarly, anticipated capture appears to have
influenced discussions over proposed consumer protection provisions.
Conversely, however, the absence of these concerns appears to explain the
success of changes that merely address technological change.
A. Capture of the Article 9 Drafting Process?
The first question to ask is whether actual capture of the Drafting
Committee explains the failure to address the exernalities of secured credit.
In an important article, Dean Scott has suggested that the Article 9 Study
Group process showed signs of having been captured. 92 First, he notes that
the structure of interest groups concerned with Article 9 would give rise to
concern about capture:
Where the legal regime regulates the interests of relatively cohesive
industries, the U.C.C. lawmaking process is likely to function much
differently than where the regulatory effects are diffused. Thus the
normative implications of a revision to Article 9 are likely to differ
substantially from the implications of a revision to Article 2.
Because Article 9 regulates asset-based financiers, a paradigmatic
example of well-organized and cohesive interests, the process is
susceptible to disproportionate influence by a single active interest
group representing particular financing interests. In such a case, I
suggest that the law revision process will tend to propose rules that
are both transactionally efficient and distributionally favorable to

191. The Reporters are quite forthright about this, saying:
[We think that the transfer of an effective security interest ought to be as easy,
inexpensive, and reliable as possible. For the most part, the current version of
Article 9 reflects our position: The law should not impair the ability of debtors to
secure as much or as little of their debts with as much or as little of their existing
and future property as they deem appropriate.
Harris & Mooney, supra note 3, at 2021-22.
192. Scott, supra note 38, at 1783; see also Schwartz & Scott, supra note 47, at 638-43.
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the dominating interests.'
Scott does not, however, share the actual discussions of the Article 9 Study
Group (of which he was a member). Instead, he examines the substantive
treatment by the Article 9 Study Group of proposed changes to choice-oflaw rules, filing rules, PMSI1t priority, the rule on priority in proceeds,
agricultural liens, enforcement rules, and the revision to deal with the dual
debtor problem.9 5 He suggests that amendments with regard to:
[The filing system, PMSIs, proceeds, and the treatment of
statutory liens.., tend to show: (1) that many of the key revisions
seem to promote the interests of specific classes of secured
creditors in contexts where competing interests may well be
disadvantaged, and (2) that these effects are largely hidden from
public view behind cosmetic efforts to maintain the efficacy of the
filing system. [However,] the treatment of enforcement issues and
corporate restructuring provide counterexamples that may suggest
196
the presence of competition within the dominant "coalition."'
Even though Scott does not discuss it, the rule of full priority for secured
creditors created by Article 9 also fits the description of rules that might be
viewed as a product of a captured private legislature.'97 Indeed, the
argument is particularly powerful because not only are the banking interests
concentrated, the interests harmed are diffuse. Trade creditors and
employees (in the absence of labor unions) are not well-organized, and tort
claimants' may not even know that they have an interest to defend. 8
Curiously, and possibly in contrast to the Article 9 Study Group, the
discussions of Revised Article 9 before the ALI and in the Drafting
Committee have not lacked substantive participation by people articulating
concerns that run contrary to the interests of secured creditors and banks.
Professors LoPucki, Warren, Klee, and others have raised the concern about
the externalities of Article 9 at meetings of the ALI and NCCUSL.
193. Scott, supra note 38, at 1851.
194. "PMSI" is shorthand for Purchase Money Security Interest.
195. Scott, supra note 38, at 1823-50.
196. Id. at 1825-26.
197. Scott and Schwartz point to the crucial role in the drafting of Article 9 played by
Homer Kripke, then affiliated with CIT Credit Corporation. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 47,
at 638; see also Grant Gilmore, Dedication to Professor Homer Kipke, 56 N.Y.U. L Rev. 1, 9, 14
(1981) (stating that Homer Kripke served as the principal draftsman of the 1972 revision of
Article 9, which immensely improved the 1962 text by clarifying unintended obscurities,
correcting mistakes, and providing solutions to problems that were ignored in the original
draft). See also Kripke, supra note 1, at 323-24 (describing the interplay between academics and
practitioners in the drafting of the Code).
198. Banks also frequently serve as unsecured creditors and therefore have an interest in
ensuring that unsecured creditor interests are properly served by Article 9. However, bank
creditors, even in the guise of unsecured creditors, are not the creditors who are harmed by
the full priority system. Bank creditors are in a position to check the Article 9 financing
system, and can either bargain for loan covenants or adjust their interest rates to account for
the possibility of debtor misbehavior.
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Similarly, consumer positions were argued forcefully by Hillebrand among
others. While the Warren Proposal was rejected out of hand, the initial
inclusion of consumer protection provisions undercuts the argument that
the drafting committee was captured by secured creditor interests. For these
reasons and the reasons discussed below, the failure of these ideas to take
hold appears to be less a product of a failure of representation and more a
symptom of a process held hostage by concerns about uniformity."9
B. Applying the Decision Rule
Thus, even though the Article 9 Drafting Committee does not appear
to be captured and affected groups appear to have participated in the
process, it does appear to be constrained. As such, anticipated capture and
anticipated state competition may provide a better explanation for the
Revisers' failure to address secured credit's distributive consequences.
1. Anticipated Capture and Article 9
As discussed above, °° capture is a concern any time a proposed rule
has significant redistributive consequences and there is an asymmetry
between the strength of the interest group that benefits from the rule and
the strength of the interest group that is harmed. Because of the collectiveaction problem, the strength of an interest group is often inversely related
to the size of the affected group.20 ' Larger and more diffuse groups have
greater difficulty organizing, and they tend to be underrepresented in the
legislative process. As Professor Scott has noted, an interest group
asymmetry exists with regard to Article 9.202 Banks are a relatively
concentrated and well-organized group. Employees and tort claimants are
comparatively diffuse and disorganized groups. Even assuming that these
groups are well-represented in the Article 9 Drafting Committee, this does
not mean that they will be well-represented in the legislatures of each of the
fifty states. Here, the public choice prediction becomes very important. It
may be possible to correct representational problems in one or two state
legislatures, but the ALl is not in a position to ensure balanced
representation in the legislatures of all fifty states. Thus, a prediction of
199. A legislature may be captured even when all affected groups are represented when
one group controls enough votes to consistently win on any disputed issue. Here, however,
Gail Hillebrand, for example, had some success in getting consumer issues onto the agenda.
See supra notes 167-68. However, most were removed from the final draft in order to ensure
adoption of the Revision. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
201, Olson, supra note 58, at 128 ("The privileged and intermediate groups often triumph
over the numerically superior forces in the latent or large groups because the former are
generally organized and active whereas the latter are normally unorganized and inactive.")
202. See Scott, supra note 38, at 1838 ("The recommended revisions in PMSI and proceeds
rules generally confirm the prediction that special interest legislation is more likely to be
adopted when the subject matter of the regulation is confined and invisible to the potentially
opposed publics.").
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capture (of some subset of state legislatures) turns into a prediction that if
the Revisers resist the banking interests at the drafting stage, nonuniform
adoption will likely result. Thus, anticipation of capture may have played a
role in the decision to reject the Warren Proposal.
Where consumer protection provisions were involved, the anticipation
of capture was placed in high relief. Consumer advocates, who were not
voting members of the Drafting Committee, were able to influence the
drafting process by threatening to oppose a Revision, which did not include
their proposed reforms. Similarly, representatives of the consumer credit
industry, who were not themselves voting members of the drafting
committee, were able to use their own threat to oppose the statute in state
legislatures to block the inclusion of these reforms. Both groups used the
threat to oppose the Revision in state legislatures as leverage in
negotiations. The result was a stalemate. Banking interests were unable to
eliminate existing consumer protections, and consumer advocates also were
unable to expand them substantially. Concern about enactibility and
anticipation of state capture played a major role in the shape of the final
agreement. The Revisers were expressly driven by the need to gain support
of the consumer credit industry and to prevent consumer opposition.
2. Anticipated State Competition and Article 9
In addition to anticipated capture, anticipated state competition is
likely to play a role in the Article 9 Revision. First, Article 9 provides states
with an opportunity to compete with each other. If a state can provide
favorable rules to creditors, then local businesses may be able to borrow at
lower interest rates than businesses in other states. This will in turn increase
the level of business activity in the state. In other words, states will compete
for loans or for favorable loan terms for local debtors. Similarly,
corporations may choose to locate major facilities in jurisdictions where they
can take advantage of secured creditor-friendly rules to obtain a reduced
cost of capital.
Will the effect of this competition be favorable (a race to the top) or
unfavorable (a race to the bottom)? To answer this question, it is necessary
to apply the second (agency/intrafirm externality) and third (interstate
externality) tests of the decision rule.
a. IntrafirmExternality (Agency Cost)
First, the rule of absolute priority creates the possibility of intrafirm
externality. There is a conflict of interest between two corporate
constituencies: shareholders, on the one hand, and nonconsensual and
nonadjusting creditors on the other. 0 3 Whenever a corporation faces
substantial claims by tort claimants, employees or other nonadjusting
creditors, the corporate officers can increase the value of the corporation's
203.

See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
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stock by borrowing on a secured basis. The debtor obtains a reduction in
interest rate, but the nonadjusting creditors do not demand a risk premium
to compensate for the increased riskiness of their claims. Because managers
owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders and because managers and
shareholders (where they can conquer the collective-action problem) control
the incorporation decision, corporations would be expected to incorporate
in states that have adopted the rule of full priority in order to maximize
shareholder wealth. As such, the "agency costs" component of the decision
rule would predict that the uniform law process would operate to anticipate
and effectuate a race to the bottom with regard to priority for secured
creditors,
By definition, consumer protection provisions are unlikely to implicate
intrafirm externality. Consumers are not firms, and the hardships that the
consumer advocates seek to address are hardships to the debtor him or
herself, rather than to their creditors. As such, the "agency costs"
component would not likely cause a race to the bottom with regard to
consumer protection provisions.
b. InterstateExternality
A race to the bottom is also likely when a state can obtain benefits for
its own citizens and place the burden on citizens of other states. The rule of
full priority would again seem to fall into this category. For example,
Delaware is a small state. Many businesses incorporated in Delaware do
business nationwide. Therefore, Delaware citizens will not bear all the costs
of torts committed by Delaware corporations. Delaware will therefore have
an incentive to compete for loans and for the location of corporate assets by
offering a favorable priority rule.2 ° With regard to consumer protection
provisions, a more balanced result would be predicted. Consumer credit
transactions usually involve collateral located in the same state as the
debtor. Thus, even in Delaware, the costs of bank overreaching would be
borne directly by Delaware citizens.
Thus, if one seeks to predict the behavior of the Article 9 Revisers with
regard to priority for secured creditors, the decision rule would predict that
anticipated capture and an anticipated race to the bottom would drive the
Revisers to adopt a rule of full priority in order to prevent nonuniform
adoption. The rule distributes value to banks at the expense of
nonconsensual and nonadjusting creditors. The rule of full priority benefits
corporate shareholders at the expense of nonconsensual and nonadjusting
creditors, and the rule of full priority raises the spectre of interstate
204. As discussed in the next section, under this view, the amendment to section 9-103, as
proposed in the July Draft of Revised Article 9, would have created an incentive for states to
use Article 9 as a tool in the incorporation game. July Draft, supra note 25. To prevent this
problem section 9-301 of the Proposed Final Draft adopts a bifurcated approach, under which

the law of perfection (where and how to file) is governed by the law of the debtor's location,
but the effect of perfection (priority) is governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the
collateral is located. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 12, § 9-301.
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externality. By contrast, if the decison rule is applied to consumer
protection provisions, anticipated capture would be predicted, and
anticipation of capture can be observed.
This application of the decision rule offers a powerful prediction of
and perhaps an explanation for the Revisers' reluctance to alter the Article
9 priority scheme in the ways that Professors Bebchuck and Fried, LoPucki,
and Warren have suggested. First, capture is implicated because secured
lenders, harmed by any rule that removes the subsidy of secured credit, will
likely be in a position to block enactment of that rule because nonadjusting
and involuntary creditors are disorganized and diffuse interests. Second,
anticipated capture is a concern because corporate managers can obtain a
lower cost of capital at the expense of a disenfranchised corporate
constituency. Third, a race to the bottom would be likely because states can
externalize the costs of adopting a rule that favors secured creditors. For
these reasons, the risk of adoption of nonuniform rules would be high if
Revised Article 9 contained a rule less favorable to secured creditors than
that contained in current Article 9. Similarly, the decision rule helps to
predict and explain the fate of the consumer protection proposals, which
resulted in an imperfect, but hard-fought compromise, driven by the
anticipated capture of state legislatures.
C. EmpiricalEvidence: The Legislative History
Having shown that the decision rule predicts that both anticipated
state competition and anticipated capture would likely play a role in the
deliberations of the Drafting Committee over the rule of full priority, and
that the anticipation of capture would implicate consumer provisions, the
next task is to determine whether those three concern are having the
predicted effects. There is some anecdotal evidence that they are playing a
role. First, Professor Mooney's flippant response to the Warren proposal
appears to be driven more by concern that it will impair uniform adoption
than by an objection to its substance (though he clearly objects to its
substance as well). 05 Similarly, Professor James White has raised concerns
that the dispute over the Warren Proposal and consumer issues is
endangering uniform enactment. He states that the absence of consensus
over the issue of absolute priority is creating a substantial risk that it will be
impossible to achieve uniform adoption of Revised Article 9.216
More importantly, the drafting history of Revised Article 9
demonstrates a fairly sophisticated understanding and response to the
problem of state competition, as demonstrated by the evolution of the
Revision's choice-of-law provision. As noted above, under current Article 9,
the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located governs the
perfection (where to file) and effect of perfection (priority) of a security
205. See supra text accompanying note 24.
206. White, Comments, supra note 15, at 222. White uses the metaphor of a truck caught on
the crown of a "deeply rutted road," unable to go forward, but unable to turn back.
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interest in ordinary goods. 0 7 By contrast for mobile goods, accounts, and
general intangibles, the law of the jurisdiction where the debtor is located
governs the perfection and effect of perfection.0 8 In response to the
availability of computers, the Revisers decided that it would be easier to
adopt a rule that required the search of only one jurisdiction for all of a
debtor's assets. A brief description of how that rule achieved its current
form is illustrative.
When it first considered modifying Article 9's choice-of-law rule, the
Article 9 Study Committee initially rejected filing in the debtor's state of
incorporation in favor of filing at the headquarters of the debtor
corporation. Indeed, when Professor LoPucki raised the matter at a meeting
of the ALI Conference in May of 1993, the reaction to filing in the state of
incorporation was overwhelmingly negative. According to LoPucki, the fear
was expressed that filing at the place of incorporation, whatever its merits,
was not politically viable because it would shift too much money-in the
form of UCC filing fees-to Delaware. 2° Professor LoPucki then undertook
an empirical study to estimate the shift in filing fees. 21" LoPucki's study
suggested that the amount of fee shift from other states (ignoring local
filing, which was being abolished anyway) would be between $1.6 and $3.3
million. 211 Once the problem had been shown to be only a $2-3 million
problem, the drafters shifted to filing at the debtor's place of incorporation.
The July Draft of the Revision therefore amended section 9-103 to provide
that for all collateral, the perfection (where to file) and effect of perfection
(priority) would be governed by the law of the debtor's state of
incorporation.
This was not the end of the discussion, however. The comment to the
choice-of-law provision in the ProposedFinal Draft notes that the approach
taken in section 9-103 of the July Draft was further criticized.1 2 Delaware,
for example, might decide to favor its local debtors by adopting
nonuniform priority rules. In response to this criticism, later drafts and the
Proposed Final Draft further revised section 9-103 (now section 9-301) to
provide for a bifurcated approach, stating that the law of perfection (where
to file) would be governed by the law of the debtor's location, but the effect
of perfection would be governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the
collateral is located. This amendment is aimed directly at preventing a race
to the bottom. Under the Proposed Final Draft, a creditor knows precisely
where to file and where to search, but an individual state can only adopt
priority rules that affect collateral located within its jurisdiction. This
207.
208.

U.C.C. § 9-103 (1995).
Id. § 9-103(3)(b).

209.

LoPucki Letter, supra note 54. According to Professor LoPucki, some people "jokingly

suggested" that he was "an agent of the state of Delaware." Id.
210. LoPucki, Filing,supra note 16, at 638-45.
211. Id. at645.
212. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 12, § 9-301 cmt. LoPucki's article had noted this
concern. LoPucki, Filing,supra note 16, at 632-36.
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version has the effect of limiting the possibility of the interstate externality
noted above, but it does not eliminate it entirely. As in prior law, no
bifurcation exists for accounts, general intangibles, and mobile goods.2 13
Furthermore, corporations may choose to locate assets where a favorable
rule exists. -' 4 Thus, the amendment does not eliminate the race to the
bottom entirely; it simply prevents the Revision from making it worse.
Nonetheless, this amendment provides direct evidence that concerns about
anticipated capture and anticipated state competition are playing a role in
the deliberations over Revised Article 9.
Finally, the debate over consumer protection provisions ended after a
year of diplomacy with an agreement to return to prior law. According to
the Reporters, the Chair of the Drafting Committee represented that if the
package of proposals were accepted by the Drafting Committee and its
sponsors, representatives of consumer creditors involved in the process
would actively support, and advocates of consumer interests involved in the
process would not oppose, enactment of revised Article 9.2 15 Indeed, the
Reporters offered this sobering assessment:
[t]he proposed solution of the consumer-related issues has been
recognized by all concerned as a compromise. The statutory text
that has emerged is less than ideal in substance and approach. It
represents a balance struck in the hope that it will enhance the
opportunities for prompt and uniform enactment of revised Article
9.216

There is no evidence here that the Reporters were anticipating a race to the
bottom, but as predicted, anticipation of capture and the desire for uniform
enactment appear to have shaped the Proposed Final Draft. This insight is
rendered even more powerful when one recognizes that the consumer
advocates and consumer credit industry representatives were not themselves
members of the Drafting Committee. Even without votes, they wielded
substantial influence in the drafting process.
Thus, concerns about uniformity, in the form of anticipated capture
and anticipated state competition, appear to be operating. Therefore any
NCCUSL-based effort to limit the externalities of secured credit
transactions is doomed to fail, either in the drafting process or during the
process of enactment, and any efforts to protect consumers will be severely
constrained.

213.
214.

Proposed Final Draft, supra note 12, § 9-301.
This bifurcated approach does not eliminate entirely the risk of a race to the bottom

with regard to discussions of the rule of absolute priority. As noted above, see supra notes 6566, 83-86 and accompanying text, anticipated capture and agency problems still remain.

Furthermore, if a jurisdiction adopts the rule of partial priority, a creditor may charge a
higher interest rate in thatjurisdiction and a debtor may therefore choose not to locate assetsa factory, for example-in thatjurisdiction. See infra note 218.
215. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 12, at xxxi (Reporters' Prefatory Comments).
216. Id. at xxxiii.
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IV. NONUNIFORM AND FEDERAL LAWAS ALTERNATIVES

If the uniform law process is not well-equipped to regulate the
externalities of secured credit, or to incorporate consumer protective
provisions into Article 9, are nonuniform or federal law equal to the task?
In this Part, I explore these questions and conclude that nonuniform state
law does not offer a solution, but that federal law might.
A. State Law
As noted above, anticipated state competition is likely to doom any
efforts to use Article 9 to address the externalities of secured credit or to
protect consumers. An individual state might nonetheless try to enact such a
regulation on its own, outside the Article 9 scheme. For example, a state
could adopt a priority for tort claimants through a statutory lien, akin to a
mechanic's lien, that would have priority over an Article 9 lien. A state could
similarly adopt the Warren Proposal through a state law lien or through a
nonuniform amendment to current section 9-301.
This nonuniform state law approach has a lot to recommend it.
Although secured creditor interests will still have substantial power within
individual state legislatures, such interests are, from time to time, overcome
by other interests. State legislatures are more public fora than the relatively
private meetings of the Article 9 Drafting Committee. In addition, as Justice
Brandeis recognized, states can often function as the "laboratories" of
democracy 217 where policies can be tried out on a smaller scale. If a few
states were to adopt a "tort first" rule or a "partial priority" rule, the
Revisers would have an opportunity to evaluate the rule's effects before
trying it out on the nation as a whole.
However, there are a number of countervailing concerns that may
counsel against such a nonuniform approach. First, in each state, the
collective-action problem will operate to the advantage of secured creditor
interests and to the disadvantage of trade creditors, employees, and tort
claimants. As a result, although efforts may succeed in one state or another,
these successes are likely to be isolated, and the amount of regulation
provided by nonuniform state law is likely to be suboptimal. If nonuniform
enactment of "tort first" or "partial priority" is likely to be isolated, another
more fundamental concern arises. "Tort first" and "partial priority" are
likely to raise the cost of credit for enterprises whose loan transactions are
governed by the law of the nonuniform jurisdiction. Indeed, on some level,
that is exactly what these measures are supposed to do. A jurisdiction that
adopts one of these rules would likely have affirmatively decided to accept
these costs. However, when states use nonuniform enactments, an adopting
'21 8
and "partial priority 2'' 19
state would face another cost. Because "tort first
217. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J, dissenting).
218. If a state adopts a tort-first rule, lenders in that state would begin to require
borrowers to purchase liability insurance in order to ensure that no tort claimant took priority
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will raise the cost of capital for in-state corporations relative to out-of-state
corporations, state competition would likely operate in reverse. Businesses
with mobile assets would flee the adopting jurisdiction in favor of a
jurisdiction where they could obtain a lower cost of capital. Once this
concern is recognized (and business interests are likely to point it out early
on), the likelihood that any jurisdiction will adopt a "tort first" or "partial
priority" rule begins to look exceedingly small 2 ° Thus, assuming that
either "tort first" or "partial priority" is an efficient rule, the ability of
individual states to externalize the costs associated with the rule of full
priority is likely to result in an actual, rather than an anticipated, race to the
bottom.
With regard to consumer protection, nonuniform law may work
somewhat better. Consumers still face a collective-action problem. However,
they may be able to organize in individual states. Where the collectiveaction problem can be overcome, the race-to-the-bottom problem would not
seem to exist. Even though consumer protection might lead to higher
interest rates or higher prices for consumers in consumer-protective
jurisdictions, it is unlikely that many people will alter their decisions on
where to live based on such concerns.

over the lender. This requirement would increase the cost of capital for enterprises seeking to
secure financing based on collateral located in the tort-first jurisdiction. This would have a
number of effects, all of them negative. First, firms in that jurisdiction might find themselves
at a competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis firms in a non-tort-first jurisdiction. Second, firms with
movable assets and the need to engage in secured financing might seek to move their assets to
another jurisdiction in order to avoid the additional financing costs associated with the rule.
The end result would be a capital outflow from the state that adopted the efficient rule. To
make matters worse, the adoption of tort first in one jurisdiction would not have the effect of
increasing safety in that jurisdiction. Torts would still be committed by out-of-state creditors,
including those who left to avoid the impact of the law.
219. A similar effect could be expected if a state adopted Bebchuck and Fried's rule of
partial priority. First, it would increase the level of monitoring by secured creditors. Some of
this monitoring might be efficient, hut it is likely that, at least when a firm has multiple
secured creditors, some of this monitoring will be duplicative. Second, banks might impose
stricter financial covenants on lenders in the partial priority jurisdiction. Third, they would
likely increase interest rates to account for these additional costs, plus the additional risk of
default. Again, the likely result would be that businesses seeking financing would move assets
out of the partial priority jurisdiction, and businesses which could not relocate would be at a
competitive disadvantage with enterprises from other jurisdictions.
220. This argument does rest on the assumption that states either have industry and want
to keep it or want to get it. Some states may not fit this description. Vermont appears to be a
notable example. Lynn LoPucki points out that not all industry would flee a tort-first
jurisdiction-only industry that was consciously externalizing its debt. The creditors of an
adequately capitalized company lose nothing by putting tort claims first. Lopucki Letter, supra
note 54. This may not be true, however. As noted above, the likely result of a tort-first regime
is that secured lenders would insist that all debtors carry liability insurance. The requirement
of insurance would be imposed on all debtors, not just debtors who were externalizing tort
risk.
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B. FederalRegulation
If neither the uniform law process nor nonuniform state law can be
expected to adopt a rule that addresses the externalities of secured credit,
and to a lesser extent consumer protection provisions, does federal law
provides a better alternative? For a number of reasons, it may.
1. Competition and Capture
First, and most obviously, concerns about interstate competition and
the race to the bottom disappear. A federal law will, by definition, displace
inconsistent state law. There would be no concerns about capital flows
between and among the states.2 2' Second, with regard to questions of
capture, by comparison to the uniform law process, the federal lawmaking
process, while not perfect, is open and accessible to various interest groups.
By comparison to the nonuniform law process, there is a greater likelihood
that even diffuse and disorganized interests will have some representation at
the federal level. There is some empirical support for this proposition from
both the federal Bankruptcy Code222 and from federal enactments in the
payment law area.
2. Interest Groups and the Bankruptcy Code
Although the subject of interest group influence on the United States
Bankruptcy Code is too large for any systematic treatment here, unsecured
creditor interests as well as other creditor constituencies have tended to fare

221. There might be some concern about international capital flows. Some businesses
might be in a position to insulate their assets from U.S. tort liability by moving the assets
offshore or by incorporating offshore. For most businesses, the costs of doing this would be
substantial and would likely outweigh the relatively small increase in capital costs occasioned
by a change in the priority rule. But see LoPucki, Death, supra note 30, at 2. Lopucki notes:
In recent years, computer technology has dramatically reduced the cost of record
generation and, consequently, the cost of keeping chips out of the pot. Major
players are reducing their stakes. By doing so, they are breaking down the social
norms and cultural barriers that prevent further reductions. The process is feeding
on itself. Soon no one will have significant chips in the pot. When that happens the
fundamental nature of the game will change. Liability will die.
Id.
222. The Federal Bankruptcy Code already contains a number of priorities for employees.
See Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (3) (1994) (giving priority to claims for pay earned over
90-day period prior to filing); id. § 1113 (limiting circumstances under which a collective
bargaining agreement may be rejected); id. § 1114 (limiting circumstances under which
retirees' benefits may be modified). Similarly, section 362 (the automatic stay) contains a long
list of exceptions obtained by various special interest lobbies. Id. § 362. Tort claimants,
however, do not get the benefit of any special priorities. Tort claimants do get the benefit of
two exceptions to discharge: section 523(a)(6) applies to debts relating to willful and malicious
injury; and section § 523(a)(9) exempts damages for death or personal injury caused by drunk
drivers. While uncontroversial conceptions of morality rather than interest group politics
probably account for the first exemption, Mothers Against Drunk Driving provided the
impetus for the second.
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better under federal law than under state law. 2 3 In addition, discussions
about bankruptcy law have tended to address questions of distributive policy
more directly.224 Indeed, there has been a great deal of pulling and tugging

among secured creditor interests, unsecured creditor interests, and debtor
interests. On the one hand, the Bankruptcy Code has been criticized by
creditors as being too pro-debtor. On the other hand, both the 1984225 and
1994226 amendments showed signs of heavy creditor influence. 7 As this
article goes to press bankruptcy reform bills are pending in Congress (H.R.
3150 and S. 1301). Though both versions show heavy signs of influence by
the consumer credit industry, the Senate Bill shows some limited signs of
solicitude for consumer interests, and the President has threatened to veto
the House Bill if enacted. Only time will tell whether this legislation will
ultimately be enacted, and if so, whether it will be more balanced in its final
form. In short, both unsecured creditor and debtor interests appear to be
represented, with varying degrees of success, at the federal level. 2

223. The Bankruptcy Code contains numerous group specific priorities and exemptions
that favor groups that have been able to convince Congress that they are particularly likely to
be harmed by a businesses failure. A number of these priorities and exemptions favor groups
that, while not well organized at the state level, have strong representation at the federal level.
These include priorities for employees, §§ 507(a)(3), 1113, retirees, § 1114, alimony and
support claimants, § 507(a)(7), and tax claimants, § 507(a)(8). The Bankruptcy Code also
exempts from discharge certain support and alimony claims. §§ 523(a)(5), (15).
224. Whether this is a good or a bad thing has been the subject of much debate. See
Jackson, supra note 120 (arguing that resolving the collective-action problem associated with a
debtor's insolvency is the sole purpose for the federal bankruptcy scheme); Douglas G. Baird,
Loss Distribution,Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L Rev. 815, 822,

827 (1987) (arguing rules for distributing losses within and without bankruptcy should be
generally the same, with differences following from the reasons for having the two systems).
But see Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Chi. L Rev. 775, 785-89 (1987) (arguing
that the purpose of the bankruptcy scheme is to distribute the losses associated with business
failure); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymakingin an Imperfect World, 92 Mich. L Rev. 336

(1993) (same).
225. The so called "shopping center" amendments are an example. See 11 U.S.C. § 365
(1994).
226. The amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 550 to eliminate the "Deprizio Problem" is an
example. The "Deprizio Problem" arose when courts, beginning with the Seventh Circuit,
Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1986), allowed bankruptcy
trustees to reach back to reclaim preferential payments made within one year to creditors
whose debt was guaranteed by an insider of the debtor. David G. Hicks, The October Surprise:
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994-An Analysis of Title II-The Commercial Issues, 29 Creighton L

Rev. 499, 503-04 (1996).
227. For a brief but engaging account of the tension between secured creditors and
unsecured creditors, characterized as the war between Bankruptcy and Article 9, see Nickles,
supra note 87.

228. Unsecured creditors and tort claimants will face collective-action problems at the
federal level as well, and there is reason to expect their interests to be somewhat
underrepresented. Nonetheless, there is a greater likelihood that they will not be completely
overmatched.
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3. Interest Groups and Payment Law
Just as the law of debtors and creditors has a state law (Article 9) and a
federal law (bankruptcy) component, payment law is divided between
Articles 3, 4, and 4A, on the one hand, and a number of federal laws
230
2
governing check collection- and electronic funds transfers on the other.
We have already seen how the control of the uniform law process by bank
interests affected the drafting of Article 4.231 The federal statutes, by
contrast, show evidence of a much more balanced tug-of-war between bank
interests and consumer interests. 23 2 Congress enacted the Expedited Funds
Availability Act ("EFAA") expressly to protect consumers from excessive
periods of float allowed by Article 4 and used by banks as an obvious source
of profit. Similarly, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act ("EFTA") takes a far
more pro-consumer approach to risk of loss in the event that a credit card is
stolen than Article 4 of the UCQ does with regard to checks.23- ' Finally, the
experience with payment law provides an example of what can happen to a
uniform law when it fails to address at the state level the concerns of an
interest group that has power at the federal level. The EFAA and EFTA
preempt large portions of Article 4.
One final concern about federal regulation bears mentioning. Any
lawyer who has spent any time working with the Bankruptcy Code, the
EFAA, or the EFTA knows that, although these statutes may reflect a more
balanced set of policy choices, they are not examples of finely-honed
statutory draftsmanship. The UCC is a model of clarity and craftsmanship
by comparison
to the federal statutes and may be a better statutory
,2 4

"product.

In sum, federalization of the Article 9 priority scheme would likely
have certain benefits and some costs. The benefit would be in an enhanced
ability to address distributive questions raised by the secured credit system.
The cost would likely be a less user-friendly statute. However, when, as with
the Article 9 priority scheme, the decision rule predicts that the uniform law
process will fail, either because of capture, anticipated capture or an
anticipated race to the bottom, the benefits of federalization would appear
229.

See Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 635

(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1988)); Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R.

pt. 229 (1996).
230.
231.
232.

See Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693a-1693r (1994).
See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
See Rubin, Efficiency, Equity, supra note 3, at 586.

233. See id. For example, the consumer's risk of loss is limited, in most circumstances, to
$50. Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693(g) (1994).
234. See Rubin, Efficiency, Equity, supra note 3, at 592. In Rubin's opinion:
The revisions of Articles 3 and 4 are superbly drafted, and represent high levels of
technical achievement. Underneath their polished surface, however, they are deeply
flawed ....
The Electronic Funds Transfer Act is a much better statute, which could
be readily adapted to cover the checking system as well as electronic funds transfers.
It is a more rough-hewn piece of work, but it is strong and solid on the inside.

ARTICLE 9
to outweigh the costs. The "selective abstention," or even a "selective federal
- 5
preemption" approach appears to have some merit.2

CONCLUSION

The ALI and NCCUSL have generally been successful at identifying
talented and experienced practitioners and academics to participate in the
drafting process. The ALI and NCCUSL operate on a national scale.
Therefore, when technical expertise is required, they have been successful
at identifying experts in greater quantity than might be available in
individual states. As a result, the uniform law process has been successful at
drafting laws that are well-written and that have worked well.
Nonetheless, the uniform law process has a number of problematic
characteristics. First, the ALI and NCCUSL are organizations with limited
membership and a low political profile. Because of this, the number of
groups that are represented in the process may be unduly constricted. Even
though it is a national forum, there is reason to believe that the number of
affected groups participating in the process is likely to be smaller than the
number that would participate in open legislative proceedings at either the
state or federal level. Thus when redistributive issues are involved, capture
is more likely. Second, even when the ALI/NCCUSL process is not
captured, the uniform law drafters must consider the possibility that
individual state legislatures may be captured. If uniform adoption is a goal,
the uniform law drafters must anticipate and mimic the rule that would be
adopted by a captured legislature. Third, the desire for uniform adoption
may have perverse effects when a proposed uniform law presents the
possibility of a race to the bottom. This is likely when either (1) the rule
distributes corporate assets among corporate constituencies, when either the
benefitted or burdened corporate constituency (but not both) faces a
collective-action problem or otherwise lacks a voice in the corporate
decisionmaking process; or (2) the rule allows citizens of, and businesses
located in, one state to impose costs on citizens of other states. In either of
these situations, the drafters will have one of two options, neither of them
attractive. They may seek to mask the distributive choice, or they may
anticipate and facilitate the race to the bottom. Indeed, they may do both.
For these reasons, when these factors are present, the federal system may
provide a better mechanism for making these distributive choices.
On some level, none of this is new. Indeed, Homer Kripke identified,
and on some level applauded, many of the dynamics I find troubling in the
235. One weakness of the selective abstention approach is that it may not always be easy to
differentiate between rules with distributive consequences and rules without distributive
consequences. For example, if secured credit is inefficient, and harms involuntary and
nonadjusting creditors, anything that makes secured credit easier, it could be argued,
facilitates an inefficient institution. However, if a selective abstention approach can lead to an
effective resolution of the distributive justice and efficiency questions, a uniform law that
effectively reduces transaction costs would be a good thing.
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drafting of the original Uniform Commercial Code. As he saw it,
enactability was paramount, and rendered the process inherently
conservative:
The Code was "lawyers' legislation," largely outside the potential
understanding of most members of state legislatures, and too big to
be grasped by even the studious lawyer members. Difficult
legislation like this without a popular appeal can seldom be passed
without a broad consensus of agreement of interested parties. The
determined opposition of well-knit groups tends to induce the
legislature to do nothing, which is a victory for the opposition. The
Code would have been a sitting duck target for any determined
special interest or combination of special interests who chose to
attack one or more features of the bill persistently. Thus, it was
important not to arouse the opposition of banks or finance
companies, warehouse companies, railroads, or other private trade
23-0
groups.
However, as I have argued, the constraint on the uniform process imposed
by this need for consensus can have pernicious effects on the substance of
uniform laws.
Where Article 9 is concerned, a selective abstention approach to
uniform enactments suggests that, at the very least, the secured credit
priority scheme should be regulated on the federal level, and that consumer
protection may be more productively sought in state and federal legislatures
than through the private ALI/NCCUSL process. Where other uniform
enactments are involved, these principles may give guidance as to whether
and how to allocate responsibility between federal and state lawmaking
bodies.

236.

Kripke, supra note 1, at 327.

